

Independent Terminal Evaluation

Strengthening the national quality infrastructure to facilitate trade and enhance consumer protection

UNIDO Project No.: 100209



UNITED NATIONS
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION

**INDEPENDENT EVALUATION DIVISION
OFFICE OF EVALUATION AND INTERNAL OVERSIGHT**

Independent Terminal Evaluation

IRAQ

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Vienna, 2018

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AIDMO	Arab Industrial Development and Mining Organization
ARAC	Arab Accreditation Cooperation
AWPB	Annual Work Plan and Budget
CAWTAR	Centre of Arab Woman for Training and Research
COSQC	Central Organization for Standardization and Quality Control
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning (UNIDO internal system)
FDA	Food and Drug Administration Law
HACCP	Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points
HQ	Headquarters
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
ILAC	International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation
ILAC MRA	International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation Mutual Recognition Arrangement
IQAS	Iraqi Accreditation System
ISO	International Standardization Organization
ITP	International Training Programme
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoI	Ministry of Industry
MoM	Minutes of Meeting
MoP	Ministry of Planning
MRA	Mutual Recognition Arrangement (ILAC)
NRQP	National Regulatory and Quality Policy
ODG/EVQ/IEV	UNIDO Independent Evaluation Division
PT	Proficiency Testing
QI	Quality Infrastructure
SC	Steering Committee
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SMTQ	Standards, Metrology, Testing and Quality

SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Swedac	Swedish Board for Accreditation and Conformity Assessment
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
TE	Terminal Evaluation
ToC	Theory of Change
TSU	Technical Support Unit
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Glossary of evaluation-related terms

Term	Definition
Baseline	The situation, prior to an intervention, against which progress can be assessed.
Effect	Intended or unintended change due directly or indirectly to an intervention.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.
Impact	Positive and negative, intended and non-intended, directly and indirectly, long term effects produced by a development intervention.
Indicator	Quantitative or qualitative factors that provide a means to measure the changes caused by an intervention.
Lessons learned	Generalizations based on evaluation experiences that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations.
Logframe (logical framework approach)	Management tool used to facilitate the planning, implementation and evaluation of an intervention. It involves identifying strategic elements (activities, outputs, outcome, impact) and their causal relationships, indicators, and assumptions that may affect success or failure. Based on RBM (results based management) principles.
Outcome	The likely or achieved (short-term and/or medium-term) effects of an intervention's outputs.
Outputs	The products, capital goods and services which result from an intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of an intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donor's policies.
Risks	Factors, normally outside the scope of an intervention, which may affect the achievement of an intervention's objectives.
Sustainability	The continuation of benefits from an intervention, after the development assistance has been completed.
Target groups	The specific individuals or organizations for whose benefit an intervention is undertaken.

Executive summary

The project has been implemented by UNIDO under an agreement signed with Ministry of Planning (MoP) in Iraq and Sida (donor). The main national implementing partner has been the Central Organization for Standardization and Quality Control (COSQC). Overall management responsibility has rested with UNIDO HQ in Vienna, supported by a Technical Support Unit (TSU) in Amman and one logistics and liaison officer in Baghdad. UNIDO further entered into two sub-contracting arrangements; UNCTAD (WTO component) and Swedac (accreditation component). A strategic level Steering Committee, formed by the MoP and including members from all relevant Iraqi government bodies, has guided the implementation of the project.

The two specific objectives of the terminal evaluation were to i) assess the project performance in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and progress to impact, and ii) develop a series of findings, lessons and recommendations for enhancing the design of new and implementation of on-going projects by UNIDO. In doing so, the full set of project planning and design documents was reviewed together with annual work plans, progress monitoring, and financial statement reports, and notes from steering committee meetings. A Theory of Change was reconstructed for the project, based on information from project documentation. Stakeholders were consulted in meetings in Baghdad, Amman and Vienna. The field work included field visits to project sites in Baghdad.

The project's *effectiveness* has overall been high. The Iraqi Government has approved a National Regulatory and Quality Policy (NRQP) complying with international best practices and with the WTO TBT and SPS world trade agreements. A corresponding strategic implementation plan has been developed, and technical regulation guidelines and a technical regulation law formulated. The standardization system of the COSQC has been reformed in response to the strategic direction defined in the NRQP. The national metrology system has been strengthened and meets the needs that would be required of an internationally recognized accreditation body. The new established independent Iraqi Accreditation System (IQAS) is now an associate member of the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) and a full member of the Arab Accreditation Cooperation (ARAC). IQAS is already offering independent accreditation services on the market. The mass calibration lab has already been accredited, while six more are close to being accredited. Under the conformity assessment services component, 18 testing and calibration laboratories supported by the project have been accredited by IQAS. Under the new designed national proficiency testing (PT) scheme 13 rounds have been implemented. An updated and validated Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime (MFTR) has been submitted to WTO as a result of the strengthened capacity of a core team of permanent members of the WTO Accession Negotiation Team. Unfortunately, the effectiveness within the food control system component has been weak. Under this component, the project has supported six laboratories in Baghdad and al-Basra in system development, in staff capacity building and in procurement of some equipment. These six labs all need further activities to achieve accreditation.

Following gap analysis and initial training of some 20 food processing enterprises, 6 of these SMEs were selected and supported towards meeting the requirements of HACCP/ISO 22000, and have all recommended for certification after having been audited. The intended border food control system enhancement has not been achieved, suffering from lack of cooperation and coordination between the national parties involved in controlling the borders. Outputs have thus been limited to the development of two manuals and some training of inspectors.

In light of the project's comparatively short duration of six years it is premature to expect strong and obvious **progress towards impact**. The project has however contributed to laying a basis for advancing economic competitiveness with the Government's approval of a quality infrastructure policy and regulatory framework. The availability of national conformity testing services has reduced the costs to enterprises for these services, with maintained recognition of testing results.

The project was **designed** in two phases, with the food control system component being added two years into the project. The original project intervention logic was structured under three components, in line with what should be expected from a modern approach to supporting Standards, Metrology, Testing and Quality (SMTQ). The main focus on technical solutions, capacity development and policy formulation remained valid also in the context of escalating conflict in Iraq. The project's logframe was revised to the better during the inception phase, more clearly outlining the expected chain of results, and with expected outcomes describing a change in behaviour and performance of the key institutions. Weaknesses however remained in selected indicators, which were all quantitative, and with some indicators at outcome level being a replicate of output level indicators. The design of the food control system component was over-ambitious in expecting to achieve an effective food control system adjusted/adapted to international best practices, as well as a fully operational multi-stakeholder Committee for Food Safety to be integrated in international and regional networks/platforms within the planned project duration of 2 years.

The original project was highly **relevant** regarding expected results and was well aligned with Iraq's development priorities, UNIDO's mandate, technical expertise and comparative advantages, as well as with the donor's priorities. When Iraq found itself being pushed from a 'post-conflict' situation into an outright 'conflict' situation, the project showed ability to continue implementation of planned activities, albeit at times at a slower pace and with more attention having to be diverted to security aspects. In particular the national quality policy, standardization and metrology component together with the accreditation component proved to having applied a technical solution adequately adapted to address the gaps to be filled. On the other hand, the food safety component, as designed and revised during project duration, cannot be assessed as an adequate technical solution to the development problem of unsafe food to Iraqi consumers. The inception period was cancelled, and thereby the intended in-depth contextual analysis to agree on how best to work with and across Government on enforcement aspects was also cancelled.

Overall, the project has shown a comparatively high degree of **implementation efficiency**, particularly taking into account the deteriorating security situation during the project duration. The total USD project budget was estimated based on an

agreed amount in SEK and the exchange rate prevailing at the time for project planning. Due to exchange rate fluctuations the actual USD budget available for project activities decreased from an estimated USD 12 232 558 to an actual amount of USD 11 363 660, reflecting an exchange rate loss of USD 868 898. The project's time frame has further been revised twice; a no-cost extension covering 2017 followed by an additional 3-months' no-cost extension (January-March 2018). Within the revised time frame the project results have been achieved within the available budget, by means of re-allocations of funds and revisions of expected results – some up-sized (e.g. number of labs upgraded) and some down-sized (e.g. deleted output together with more narrow focus of other outputs within the food control system component). The sub-contracting partnership arrangements with Swedac and UNCTAD have also worked efficiently. The Iraqi Government has overall provided adequate inputs in kind as planned, and also unplanned financing of a new building to free up space in the old building for hosting the new IQAS.

An exit strategy has not been formally agreed between UNIDO and the national counterparts. Instead a summary of activities seen as vital to ensure sustainability of project results was presented by UNIDO and discussed with national counterparts during the project's final SC meeting. In addition to making national budget available, **sustainability** of project results depends critically on the Government's capacity and commitment to enforce implementation of approved laws and regulations, coordination and collaboration across relevant government ministries, and putting in place adequate mechanisms to achieve relevant stakeholders' commitment. For the food safety component the complete lack of contextual alignment works strongly against institutionalization of outputs and results.

Gender mainstreaming was identified as a cross-cutting issue and a gender manual was developed during the inception phase of the original project. Despite this, gender mainstreaming has not been a strength of the project. A governance manual was also developed during the inception phase of the original project. No evidence was however provided to suggest that any part of this governance manual had been implemented, except for including some good governance aspects in training material.

The **partners' performance** in implementation has overall been satisfactory, with all implementing partners valuing each others. The SC has functioned well in its capacity, although presence in meetings has not always been as extensive as intended. UNIDO project management established clear lines for reporting and of authority with division of responsibilities between the project staff in UNIDO HQ, the TSU in Amman and the recruited officer in Baghdad. The project's main focus was to transfer knowledge and UNIDO's ability to identify and recruit required experts willing to travel to Iraq has been appreciated by the Iraqi counterparts. The sub-contracting partnerships between UNIDO an UNCTAD and Swedac respectively have been valued by the national counterparts. The two sub-contracted partners UNCTAD and Swedac in turn appreciated the flexibility and high degree of commitment from UNIDO to address emerging challenges in order to facilitate implementation also when the security situation in Iraq deteriorated. COSQC has managed to deliver its support as per agreements, and has taken corrective measures in the few cases where bottlenecks have arisen. At times the national partner has for understandable reasons been preoccupied with pressing issues such as personal security due to the

increased level of conflict, no electricity to laboratories, etc. which has in such times slowed down required responses. One limitation has been that it has not been able to achieve cooperation across participating national counterparts in implementing the food safety component. Sida has been timely in disbursing funds but has otherwise largely been absent in project implementation.

One obvious factor working against the achievement of results has been the unfortunate worsening security situation during project implementation. The project has on the other hand benefited from the fact that Iraq/COSQC has been included as a stakeholder in the regional Arab Industrial Development and Mining Organization (AIDMO) project also financially supported by Sida and implemented by UNIDO. Iraq’s participation in committees has facilitated knowledge sharing to enable Iraq to no longer be ‘left behind’ in accessing knowledge. This has proven to be an indirect factor working to speed up progress of establishing IQAS as an independent accreditation body in Iraq.

The **key overall conclusion** is that the project has been successful in achieving most of the identified preconditions in the ToC. A policy and regulatory framework which is supportive to the beginnings of functioning trade facilitation has been put in place through the Government’s approval of the NRQP. IQAS is providing conformity assessment services on the market. COSQC’s implementation capacities have been upgraded to meet the needs of IQAS, and as the national standardization organization for implementation of the NRQP. Actual enforcement capacity however remains to be proven. The submission to WTO of the updated MFTR implies that Iraq has taken an important step forward as regards prospects for regional and international trade integration. Results within the food safety component were unfortunately considerably less successfully achieved, with only marginal contributions to improving the Iraqi food control system. The overarching rating is therefore assessed to be satisfactory. The level of achievement meets expectations although with some shortcomings, most of which pertaining to the added food safety component. Recommendations and lessons learned as follows.

Recommendations	
To UNIDO	
1.	Consider options for continuation of the project – including searching for alternative financing options. Six years is short for a project like this to show sustainable results. Stronger focus should be on enforcement aspects in case of continuation with a second phase and the food control system should be redesigned in such case.
2.	Ensure continued strong links between Iraq and the forthcoming second phase of regional accreditation project. In particular, support should be provided for Iraq’s continued participation in regional committees.
3.	Review / rethink UNIDO standard indicators in ERP to become conducive for results-based management – at outcome and output levels. In discussions with project management several qualitative, more relevant indicators were proposed, but as they were not included in the ERP they could not be eligible. Clearly distinguish between

	output and outcome level indicators.
4.	Strengthen UNIDO's internal enforcement mechanisms to ensure gender equality is mainstreamed in practice in projects and programs. Gender mainstreaming should be an integral part of project design and not seen as something to add on during inception or at a later stage. For this specific project, and in case funding is secured for a continuation, the progress on gender equality mainstreaming claimed in the on-going ARAC-UNIDO regional project should be exploited also for Iraq.
To the Government of Iraq	
1.	Consider additional viable measures to strengthen enforcement capacities in order to ensure implementation of policies, laws, and/or regulations developed through the project, subsequently approved by relevant bodies of the Government of Iraq.
2.	Consider additional viable measures to strengthen coordination and collaboration across Ministries in order to reinforce the development results of projects requiring cross-governmental involvement. So for instance would it be indispensable to assure that relevant governmental bodies work constructively together in order to aspire at achieving food safety in Iraq.
3.	Ensure proper funding from national budget to sustain a national quality system., including continued participation in regional and international work. The national metrology system and IQAS need more support to ensure sustainability and to continue to build trust in the conformity assessment services provided. Support to building a national metrology institute will contribute to building trust in the measurement system and benefit sustainability of the accreditation system.
To the Donor	
1.	Consider financing a second phase of selected element of the project, with stronger focus on enforcement aspects to enhance prospects for sustainability of achieved results. Continued participation in regional committees should be supported. The food control system component should be redesigned with stronger focus on consumer protection and less focus on pure technical support.
2.	In case of no support to a second phase - to consider if some elements of the project may be seen as aligned to the recent Swedish strategy for development cooperation with Iraq (2017-2021), and thus may merit to be formulated into a new project. Food safety would seem to be one such potential element.
3.	Consider more active participation in Steering Committees to ensure that important aspects are not omitted or down-played, such as happened with gender equality mainstreaming in this project, as well as with the intended strong multi-stakeholder involvement in the food control system component.
Lessons Learned	
1.	It is possible to perform long-term development cooperation also in unstable environments - such as in post-conflict/conflict. It does however require 'higher-than-normal' degree of flexibility from project management
2.	Providing in-country expert services is possible also in conflict/post-conflict countries. It is more efficient and effective with 'on-the-job' approach. It does however imply a

	heavy work load on the project team, requiring intense tendering processes, in turns requiring strongly dedicated project management and team.
3.	Approach to partnership with UNCTAD and Swedac has proven mutual beneficial – it enhanced management, coordination across components, stakeholder commitment and ensured logistics support for partners which do not have own field representation. This however requires a project management willing to go the ‘extra mile’ to provide support whenever required.
4.	A prerequisite for achieving results in unstable environments is strong – initial and visible - commitment from key national stakeholders, and the presence of such strong commitment should be carefully assessed before attempting to replicate in other conflict/post-conflict countries.

1. Introduction

1.1 Evaluation objectives and scope

The purpose of the evaluation is to independently assess the project to help UNIDO improve performance and results of future programmes and projects. The evaluation has two specific objectives:

- (i) Assess the project performance in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and progress to impact;
- (ii) Develop a series of findings, lessons and recommendations for enhancing the design of new and implementation of ongoing projects by UNIDO.

The independent terminal evaluation (TE) will cover the whole duration of the project from its starting date on 1st May 2012 to the estimated completion date on 31st December 2017, including the food safety extension which was approved at the end of 2013, as well as the no-cost extension for 2017.

1.2 Overview of the project context

1.2.1 Rationale

Developing countries face a range of challenges stemming from weak national quality systems. These challenges range from limited access to the international trade system, to inferior and unsafe consumer goods. With the increasing globalization of markets, a robust national quality system has become critical to the international trade process, promoting a level playing field for exports, and ensuring that imports and domestically-produced goods meet internationally recognized standards.

Since the lifting of the UN sanctions in 2003, Iraq has been attempting to further trade relations with the regional and international trade community. In this regard Iraq participated in 2007 and 2008 in two Working Party meetings to promote its WTO accession for which the Ministry of Trade is leading the process through a high level ministerial committee. This step is required to bring its trade regime at par with the multilateral international trading system.

However, throughout this time Iraqi consumers have been suffering from low quality products, commodities and household appliances since neither goods manufactured in Iraq, nor those imported from abroad, are subject to quality control standards. However, the awareness and application of quality assurance and quality control techniques in the production, the distribution and the importation of products is necessary to safeguard the public against the hazards of spoiled food and faulty appliances.

Inside Iraq it is the Central Organisation for Standards and Quality Control (COSQC) which is the central organisation with the mandate of managing the national quality system (Standards, Testing, Quality and Metrology), aiming at the strengthening of the country's trade capacities and consumer protection. However, due to limited capacities in almost all areas of its national quality infrastructure, the country is in need of technical support and capacity building to be able to properly address above mentioned challenges and to align its national quality system with the principles of the international trade regime.

1.2.2 Origin of the project

In 2010, a regional programme on quality infrastructure upgrading was initiated with the financial support from the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), aiming at the implementation of the regional standardization strategy endorsed by all Arab countries through the Arab Industrial Development and Mining Organization (AIDMO). This regional initiative was the basis for identifying specific complementary national needs, and was the origin for the request made by the Ministry of Planning (MoP) to Sida and UNIDO to initiate the formulation of a full-fledged technical assistance project for upgrading Iraq's national quality system.

A follow-up meeting, organised by UNIDO with the participation of COSQC and SIDA representatives, took place on 14th June 2011 in Stockholm and resulted in the formulation of a project concept note which gained initial approval of COSQC, and SIDA requesting UNIDO's support in the formulation of a detailed project document.

Upon finalization of the design phase, within which COSQC was actively engaged, the final agreement was first signed by SIDA on 14th December 2011, and subsequently the first instalment received in UNIDO's accounts on 11th January 2012. The original implementation phase was planned to last for 4.5 years and should have come to an end on 31st December 2016.

1.3 Overview of the project

1.3.1 Project objective

The project *"Strengthening the National Quality Infrastructure to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Consumer Protection in Iraq"* has been implemented in partnership with the Iraqi Ministry of Planning (MoP)/Central Organization for Standardization and Quality Control (COSQC), and was funded by Sida. The objective was to enhance the trade capacities and performance of the Republic of Iraq and to foster the country's integration into the regional and multilateral trading system. The specific objective was to upgrade the national quality infrastructure system (i.e. Accreditation, Standardization, Metrology and Conformity Assessment) in line with international best practices, in order to create the enabling environment needed for better trade performance and consumer protection. Furthermore, the project was focusing on strengthening the national food safety control system and was supporting the Republic of Iraq in developing its quality policy which will define the reforms needed at policy, legal and institutional level.

Outcome 1: Adapted to the new principles of the international trade regime, the Iraqi quality system (i.e. legal framework and infrastructure) is effective in promoting trade and in improving consumer protection, and national institutions competent in advocating and managing the national quality system

Outcome 2: Conformity assessment services (i.e. testing, certification, inspection) accredited by a regionally and internationally recognized independent Iraqi Accreditation Body are offered on the market

Outcome 3: Enhanced national trade policy framework fostering progress in the WTO accession process

Outcome 4: Effective coordination and management of the project.

Outcome 5: Effective Monitoring, Evaluation and Governance of the project.

Outcome 6: Adapted to international best practices, the Iraqi food control system is effective.

The Project was further structured into a total of 20 outputs. The full logical framework is included as Annex E. The evaluation of project effectiveness against the intended causal chain of results (logframe) is found in section 2.1.

1.3.2 Inception phase

As stipulated in the approved project document, an inception phase was planned, for a maximum period of six months, with the main objective of establishing the prerequisites required for an efficient and successful project implementation. These prerequisites included mainly project logistics, recruitment of long-term project personnel, and in-depth assessments of the country's national quality infrastructure (NRQP). Taking into account respective findings the project's log frame and budget were revised accordingly. Additionally, the inception phase had the objective of engaging the project stakeholders at an early stage to create a stimulus environment for project implementation.

While the inception phase was supposed to start right after the transfer of the first instalment, due to additional clarification requests received from the Minister of Planning, UNIDO was only able to start this first phase of the project in May 2012. The request was received in February 2012 and it required a meeting between Sida and MoP (April 2012), and a subsequent technical meeting between UNIDO and COSQC (15th and 16th May 2012 in Amman), to officially launch the inception phase. While the questions raised by the Ministry were actually already discussed with COSQC in the design phase, all issues could finally be clarified to the full satisfaction of all stakeholders. Consequently the Minister for Planning signed the project document on 9th July 2012.

All findings and outcomes of the inception phase were discussed and presented for approval and endorsement at the first Steering Committee (SC) meeting. The meeting took place on 22nd November 2012 in Erbil, Iraq and was preceded by a Technical Review meeting on 21st November 2012. All key results, findings and recommendations of the inception phase were presented in an inception report which was submitted to all

major project stakeholders and endorsed by the steering committee in its first meeting. Subsequently, the inception report was annexed to the original project document.

In general, the inception phase re-confirmed the importance and relevance of this project to the Iraqi economy, and the high interest and commitment of the national stakeholders to cooperate in its implementation.

1.3.3 Food safety extension

After the first year of full-fledged implementation substantial progress had been made in establishing Iraqi Accreditation system (IQAS) as the national accreditation body of Iraq, in initiating the progress of developing a national regulatory and quality policy, and following the formation of a permanent core negotiating team first trainings were provided on World Trade Organization (WTO) accession and other issues.

Following Sida's very positive overall assessment of the first year of implementation of the project, UNIDO and MoP/COSQC were entrusted to elaborate a proposal complementary to the ongoing intervention as to expand the overall scope of the aforementioned project. In line with the Swedish Development Strategy for Iraq, this additional component aimed at supporting the country in its endeavour to become a full member of the WTO in a complementary manner, and in particular focusing on enhancing the country's compliance with the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) agreement.

The project extension proposal was discussed in-depth with Sida in a meeting in Amman, Jordan on 22nd October 2013 and the structure followed the requirements of the new IT system of Sida. Subsequently, the proposal was reviewed by the project's steering committee and endorsed in its meeting in Amman on 2nd and 3rd December 2013.

The development objective of the project remained unchanged and was to enhance the trade capacities and performance of the Republic of Iraq and fostering integration into the regional and multilateral trading system.

While the ongoing part of the project aimed at achieving this goal by upgrading the national quality system as a whole and across various sectors, the proposed extension focused on strengthening the national food safety control system following international best practices as to create an enabling environment for better trade performance and consumer protection in this sector.

1.3.4 External project assessment

In view of the conclusion of Sweden's Development Strategy for Iraq in December 2014, and the closure of Sida's Iraq Unit in Stockholm in June 2016, a coordination meeting between UNIDO and Sida took place in November 2015 in order to discuss possible options for utilizing any remaining funds for Iraq also after the foreseen date of project closure.

In this regard Sida raised the need for an external assessment of the project which subsequently should lead to a set of recommendations which should provide the scope and framework for any possible re-allocation of funds. Following the discussions held in Stockholm, UNIDO recruited an international expert who then met in May 2016, in the presence of UNIDO staff, with counterparts from COSQC and subsequently also with Sida, in order to discuss the progress and achievements of the project, as well as the future needs and priorities in regard to the upgrading of Iraq's national quality and food control system.

The assessment report was finalized in June 2016 and a set of recommendations, focusing on strengthening the sustainability of the project's achievements, were proposed to COSQC and Sida.

1.3.5 No-cost extension of the project

Based on the assessment report, representatives from COSQC, MoP, UNIDO, and Sida met in Stockholm on 1st September 2016 to discuss the achievements of the project to date, to review the expert's recommendations for interventions beyond 2016, as well as to agree on the way forward. In this regard Sida requested from UNIDO to prepare a 'bridging document' in order to provide at output level a detailed overview on the progress made to date, activities still remaining for implementation by end 2016, as well as the activities recommended for 2017.

Based on the submitted bridging document and considering the achievements made, Sida approved on 25th November 2016 on an exceptional basis a one year no-cost extension of the project, despite the closure of their development strategy for Iraq.


1.4 Theory of Change

The Theory of Change (ToR) is a tool to help clarify the links between project support and long-term development objectives. It is crucial to identify **preconditions** which are **necessary and likely** to bring about the behavioural changes required to achieve the long-term goal of each project.

There was no explicit ToC developed for this project. Enough information was however found in project documentation and in the logical framework to construct a ToC. The draft ToC was presented and validated in the evaluation inception report, and again during the evaluation process in discussions with selected stakeholders.

The proposed ToC suggests that, in order to enhance trade capacities and performance of the Republic of Iraq and foster integration into the regional and multilateral trading system, it is key to achieve **appropriate capacities** as well as **adequate incentives** for both technological transformation and behavioural change. Within the project capacities

Figure 1: Theory of Change - Strengthening Iraq's national quality infrastructure to facilitate trade and enhance consumer protection



to bring about change would be accomplished by strengthening trade quality infrastructure in line with best practices and capable of providing services. At the enterprise level, capacities could be achieved by adapting and demonstrating technologies to produce safe goods. Incentives for change would be achieved by putting in place robust and adequate policy and regulatory framework supportive to trade facilitation together with enforcement mechanisms, and by raising awareness within decision makers, enterprises as well as general public about merits and value of new policies and of safe products.

The nature of the economic-political interaction and of human behaviour is complex, implying difficulties to predict actual outcomes of these interactions. It is therefore critical to identify the key **assumptions** based on which the project was designed.

Figure 1 illustrates how the four project technical outcomes could contribute to the preconditions for bringing about the behavioural and technological changes needed to achieve the project's development objective, i.e. to enhance trade capacities and performance of the Republic of Iraq and foster integration into the regional and multilateral trading system. Figure 1 also indicates two basic project assumptions. Project activities together with Iraqi bodies supported are seen from the logframe in Annex E.

2. Methodology

2.1 Evaluation scope and approach

The TE was conducted in accordance with the UNIDO Evaluation Policy¹ and the UNIDO Guidelines for the Technical Cooperation Project and Project Cycle.²

The evaluation was carried out as an independent in-depth evaluation using a participatory approach whereby all key parties associated with the project were informed and consulted throughout the evaluation. The evaluation team leader liaised with the UNIDO Independent Evaluation Division (ODG/EVQ/IEV) on the conduct of the evaluation and methodological issues.

The evaluation applied a theory of change approach and mixed methods to collect data and information from a range of sources and informants. It paid attention to triangulating the data and information collected before forming its assessment. This was seen as essential to ensure an evidence-based and credible evaluation, with robust analytical underpinning.

The theory of change identified causal and transformational pathways from the project outputs to outcomes and longer-term impacts, and drivers as well as barriers to achieve them. The learning from this analysis is expected to feed into the design of future projects to enable for the management team to effectively manage them based on results.

2.2 Data collection methods

Following are the main instruments for data collection:

- (a) **Desk and literature review** included (see Annex C for full list of documents):
- Project documentation including original project document, inception report, a bridging report (with a progress evaluation report of the original project components attached), the food safety extension document, annual work plans and progress monitoring reports, and financial statement reports .
 - Meeting Notes, primarily from Steering Committee meetings.
- (b) **Stakeholder consultations** were conducted through structured and semi-structured interviews and/or focus group discussion. Key stakeholders interviewed (see Annex D) included:
- UNIDO Management and staff involved in the project; and
 - Representatives of donors, implementing partners, counterparts, and beneficiaries.

1 UNIDO. (2015). Director General's Bulletin: Evaluation Policy (UNIDO/DGB/(M).98/Rev.1)

2 UNIDO. (2006). Director-General's Administrative Instruction No. 17/Rev.1: Guidelines for the Technical Cooperation Programme and Project Cycle (DGAI.17/Rev.1, 24 August 2006)

(c) **Field visit** to project sites in Baghdad in Iraq in order to meet with the project's main counter- parts and selected beneficiaries in Iraq, and the Technical Support Unit (TSU) in Amman, Jordan (see Annex D for details).

2.3 Key questions and criteria

The key evaluation questions were the following:

(a) What are the key drivers and barriers to achieve the long term objectives? To what extent has the project helped put in place the conditions likely to address the drivers, overcome barriers and contribute to the long term objectives?

(b) How well has the project performed? Has the project done the right things? Has the project done things right, with good value for money?

(c) What have been the project's key results (outputs, outcome and impact, if possible)? To what extent have the expected results been achieved or are likely to be achieved against the project design? To what extent the achieved results will sustain after the completion of the project?

(d) What lessons can be drawn from the successful and unsuccessful practices in designing, implementing and managing the project?

Detailed evaluation criteria were elaborated and are seen from the Evaluation Framework (Annex B) together with lines of inquiries, means of verification, data sources, methodology and main responsibility within the team. The evaluation further assessed the likelihood of sustainability of the project results after the project completion, including identifying key risks (e.g. in terms of financial, socio-political, institutional and environmental risks) and a discussion about how these risks may affect the continuation of results after the project ends.

2.4 Limitations

The evaluation mission had to be re-scheduled from December 2017 to February 2018 due to late issuance of required visas. When the visas were eventually granted only a couple of days remained for getting security approval as per initially planned field mission, which was not sufficient time for the security approval.

The technical scope of evaluation remained as per ToR, while the security situation in Iraq limited the scope for both number and location of field visits in Iraq. Stakeholders outside of Baghdad could not be visited and the number of visits per day had to be reduced to comply with security regulations of not being outside the Green Zone for too long a period every time of leaving the Green Zone. All planned visits could be made as no acute security incidences emerged.

Meetings in Baghdad were planned in line with requests from the evaluators. However, scheduled meetings with MoT and MoP did eventually not materialize due to what was

explained to be misunderstandings in communication when arranging meetings. A Skype-discussion was at a later stage held with a key representative from MoT. The debriefing with the Swedish Embassy in Baghdad had not been confirmed, which resulted in an unexpected and improvised visit from the Embassy's point of view. Skype discussions were held with UNCTAD and phone discussions were held with Swedac.

3. Project’s contribution to development results – effectiveness and impact

3.1 Project’s achieved results and overall effectiveness

Overall, results were achieved effectively with the exception of the food control system component (outcome 6). A brief overview of evaluation findings against expected results as set out in the project’s causal chain of results (logframe) is presented in Table 1, followed by an assessment of the project’s achieved results. As seen from Table 1, expected results are not always clearly defined but referred to as ‘rehabilitated’ or ‘enhanced’ or ‘strengthened’ (see e.g. output 3.1 and outputs 6.2 – 6.4). In these cases the assessment of achievement is based on the triangulation of evaluation findings from various sources.

Table 1: Summary of evaluation findings against expected outcome and output results

TFIRQ11004 - CAUSAL CHAIN OF RESULTS – as per logframe		EVALUATION FINDINGS
Development Objective		
To enhance trade capacities and performance of the Republic of Iraq and fostering integration into the regional and multilateral trading system.		
OUTCOME 1		
OUTCOME 1	<i>Adapted to the new principles of the international trade regime, the Iraqi quality system (i.e. legal framework and infrastructure) is effective in promoting trade and in improving consumer protection, and national institutions competent in advocating and managing the national quality system.</i>	Policy and regulatory framework supportive to beginnings of functioning quality system to facilitate trade in place.
	Output 1.1: <i>A national quality system framework (i.e. policy and a strategic action plan) is developed and promoted among all stakeholders and submitted for GoI endorsement.</i>	Achieved. A National Regulatory and Quality Policy (NRQP) which covers all quality infrastructure components has been approved by the Government. In addition to the expected output, a corresponding strategic implementation plan was developed; and technical regulation guidelines and a technical regulation law were formulated.
	Output 1.2: <i>The national metrology system is strengthened in line with the national quality system framework, and COSQC's implementation capacities upgraded, meeting the needs of an operational accreditation body.</i>	Achieved.
	Output 1.3: <i>In line with the TBT and SPS agreement COSQC's capacities as the national standardization organization are strengthened for the implementation of the national quality system.</i>	Achieved.
OUTCOME 2		
OUTCOME 2	<i>Conformity assessment services (i.e. testing, certification, inspection), accredited by a regionally and internationally recognized independent Iraqi Accreditation Body, are offered on the market.</i>	An independent IQAS (Iraqi Accreditation System) is offering services on the market and is attracting clients
	Output 2.1: <i>Following international best practice an independent national accreditation body is established and</i>	Achieved.

	<i>internationally/regionally recognized.</i>	
	Output 2.2: <i>Up to 5 testing / calibration laboratories, one certification body and one inspection body (from COSQC where possible) accredited as a pilot project for the National Accreditation Body.</i>	Achieved above target with 18 testing/calibration laboratories accredited by IQAS. One inspection body supported - in process of accreditation by IQAS. One product certification body and one management system certification body supported - in process of accreditation by IQAS.
	Output 2.3: <i>A national proficiency testing scheme developed at COSQC and implemented in partnership with regional / international partners.</i>	Achieved with 13 rounds of proficiency testing schemes developed and implemented with different scopes and various rounds (cement, steel, drinking water, concrete, balance calibration, volume glassware calibration, non-destructive testing).
OUTCOME 3		
OUTCOME 3	Enhanced national trade policy framework fostering progress in the WTO accession process.	Achieved with updated Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime (MFTR) being submitted in February 2018.
	Output 3.1: <i>Capacity of senior officials in trade policymaking built, capabilities and competencies of the national WTO negotiating team strengthened, and involvement of the private sector in policymaking and in the WTO accession process increased.</i>	Achieved.
OUTCOME 4		
OUTCOME 4	Effective coordination and management of the project	Achieved – coordination and management of project very effective
	Output 4.1: <i>Technical Support Unit in Amman operational</i>	Achieved.
	Output 4.2: <i>National Coordination support in Baghdad</i>	Achieved.
	Output 4.3: <i>UNIDO HQ support</i>	Achieved.
OUTCOME 5		
OUTCOME 5	Effective monitoring, evaluation and governance of the project, including security support	Partly achieved. Monitoring and security support achieved. Independent assessment as preparation for no-cost extension 2017 done. Terminal evaluation in progress.
	Output 5.1: <i>Monitoring, Mid-term Review, Steering Committee Meetings and security support</i>	Mid-term review cancelled. Regular monitoring reports available. Steering Committee meetings documented.
	Output 5.2: <i>Independent final evaluation</i>	In progress (to be finalized end March 2018)
INCEPTION	Inception Phase	
	<i>Inception Report (i.e. development of project guidance documents/manuals, technical mappings/gap analysis, etc.)</i>	Finalized including revised causal chain of results (logframe) and nine Annexes (among which: a monitoring and evaluation guide, a gender manual, a good governance manual and a risk assessment and mitigation plan).
	<i>Technical Review, Steering Committee/Validation meetings</i>	Inception report approved at first Steering Committee meeting (21-22 November 2012).
OUTCOME 6		
OUTCOME 6	Adapted to international best practices, the Iraqi food control system is effective.	Not achieved.
	Inception Phase	Cancelled
	Output 6.1: <i>The existing national multi-stakeholder</i>	Omitted as a result of the Parliament's adoption of a food

<i>Committee for Food Safety is fully operational and well integrated in international and regional networks/platforms.</i>	and drugs administration law as to avoid any overlaps and conflict with the implementation of the new law (Steering Committee decision at third meeting 8-9 January 2015)
Output 6.2: <i>Food testing laboratories are rehabilitated.</i>	6 food testing laboratories supported in Baghdad and Al-Basra (2 under MoH, 1 under MoA, 3 under COSQC). All need further activities to be ready for accreditation.
Output 6.3: <i>Border Food control system enhanced.</i>	Not achieved – with one inspector’s manual and one sampling manual developed and training on manual provided results are weak
Output 6.4: <i>Enhanced food safety compliance of national food-processing enterprises.</i>	Limited achievement - with 6 SMEs supported towards certification, food safety compliance is only marginally enhanced.
Final independent evaluation (see also output 5.2)	In progress (to be finalized end March 2018)

A national quality infrastructure policy (NRQP) has been developed through a participatory and multi-stakeholder approach (approved by the Iraqi Government end 2017). The NRQP policy covers all required quality infrastructure components, complying with international best practices and with the WTO TBT and SPS world trade agreements. Technical regulation guidelines and a technical regulation law were also developed, in addition to the policy formulation as planned. A multi-stakeholder committee was established for the purpose of managing the process of reforming the national quality system. The committee was chaired by the MoP and consisted of eight members, out of which the majority (six) represented the Government (MoP, COSQC, MoH, MoA, MoH, MoT) and two represented the private sector (Chambers of Trade and Commerce respectively). The members of the committee did thus not represent all relevant stakeholders, such as industry, consumer protection associations and non-governmental organizations. Stakeholders were not all equally committed to participate due to certain prevailing miss-trust between government, private sector and citizen.

The NRQP includes a strategic road map to guide its implementation. The capacity building done by the project and the commitment shown through Government’s approval of the NRQP policy contribute to expectations of sustaining achieved results. The actual enforcement capacity however remains to be seen. The national metrology system has been strengthened in line with the national quality system framework and meets the needs of an internationally recognized accreditation body (IQAS). The primary standards were calibrated to be traceable to SI units. A quality manual according to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005 was developed for the Metrology Department of COSQC. The labs have been provided with required equipment and staff capacities have been strengthened. One of the seven calibration labs (the mass lab) has already been accredited, while the temperature, electrical measurement, force and dimensional calibration labs have had their final accreditation assessment and are thus close to being accredited by IQAS. The traceability of the calibrated primary standards is sustained for the at least the next 3 years, but may thereafter become a challenge. Sustaining the membership in the regional and international organizations and the participation in Proficiency testing schemes is important but hinges on the availability of national budget allocations.

COSQC’s standardization system has been reformed and aligned with international best practices in standards setting, as well as that it is responding to the strategic direction defined

in the NRQP. The capacities of the staff and of standardization committee members were strengthened. Standardization systems and procedures were revised, developed and strengthened. A standards strategic plan for the coming years was developed and approved. These activities are efficiently sustaining the standards system. Technical regulation guidelines and a technical regulation law are in place. A training program was held to raise the stakeholders' and related bodies' awareness of the need of technical regulation. These activities are however not sufficient in order to build and sustain the system of developing and implementing technical regulations.

An Independent accreditation body IQAS has been established based on the requirements of the related international standards and practices. The legal framework was revised and approved by the Government (end of 2017). A quality management system was developed in full compliance with ISO/IEC 17011, staff has been trained and qualified on all aspects of accreditation through a series of trainings/coaching and study tours. IQAS is now an associate member of the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) and a full member of the Arab Accreditation Cooperation (ARAC). In this sense IQAS is already regionally and internationally recognized, while its full recognition depends upon a successful final peer evaluation by ARAC, whereby IQAS will become a signatory to the ILAC Mutual Recognition Arrangement (MRA). IQAS is already offering independent accreditation services on the market and 24 testing and calibration labs have been accredited against ISO/IEC 17025 and national proficiency testing schemes were designed and implemented by IQAS. In addition, IQAS is operating as a training provider. All these activities are inputs to sustain IQAS services, and becoming a signatory to the ILAC MRA will provide additional technical underpinning and enhanced confidence in the acceptance of IQAS' calibration, testing, inspection, and training results. The government is expected to also allocate an independent budget to IQAS which will in such case further contribute to IQAS' sustainability.

Under the conformity assessment services component (outcome 2), 18 testing and calibration laboratories were supported by the project, and accredited by IQAS. All labs received support in human capacity building and in system development, and a few selected labs also received equipment from the project. One inspection body, one product certification body and one management system certification body were supported in building capacities. While all three bodies have applied for accreditation (in January 2018), the expected outputs of accrediting at least one inspection body and one certification body are still in process and it remains unclear when they will be achieved. The sustainability of accreditation in the governmental and COSQC labs faces a challenge in ensuring government allocation from the required budgets.

The national proficiency testing (PT) scheme has been designed and 13 rounds of PT schemes were developed and implemented - with different scopes and various rounds in the following fields: cement, steel, drinking water, concrete, balance calibration, volume glassware calibration, non-destructive testing. A framework and operational procedures were developed as to enable IQAS to manage a national PT scheme. The capacities of IQAS staff were strengthened, a policy framework and operational procedures were developed and implemented and the allocation of a separate budget to IQAS are inputs contributing to the sustainability of the PT service providing.

Under the WTO accession component, the capacity of a core team of 6-7 permanent members of the WTO Accession Negotiation Team has been strengthened through participation in a series of workshops and training events. In each of the trainings and workshops additional stakeholders were included, but the frequent turnover of selected stakeholders excludes them from being regarded as core team members. The workshops and training events were held outside of Iraq, and provided opportunities to exchange experiences with negotiation teams from neighbouring countries. As a result, an updated and validated Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime (MFTR) was submitted to WTO in February 2018. A draft offer on trade in Services has been prepared for 6 main sectors (out of 12 Sectors in the WTO services sectors classification list). An offer on market access in Goods (updated from 2002) has been completed.

The intended inputs to the existing national multi-stakeholder Committee for Food Safety were omitted (SC decision in January 2015) as a result of the Parliament's recent adoption of a Food and Drugs Administration Law so as to avoid any overlaps and conflict with the implementation of the new law. The adoption of the law was not known when designing the food safety extension component. However, through the decision to omit the support to the multi-stakeholder committee, the food control system component was in effect reduced to rehabilitating six additional laboratories and to support a few SMEs towards certification (HACCP and ISO 22000). The support to the border food control system was reduced to developing an inspection manual and to provide training to inspectors.

Six laboratories in Baghdad and al-Basra (2 under MoH, 1 under MoA and 3 under COSQC) were supported under the food safety component (in addition to the 18 laboratories supported under the conformity assessment services component). These six labs are however not yet accredited according to ISO/ IEC 17025, and further activities are needed to achieve the intended result. The sustainability is highly dependent on the allocation of budget from the Government, but the project has supported system development and staff capacity building as well as the procurement of some equipment.

The intended enhancement of the border food control system was not achieved due to the lack of cooperation and coordination between the involved parties controlling the borders, and the absence of the law enforcement. An inspection manual and a sampling manual/guide were developed, and trainings for inspectors were held in-country and one final training was delivered in Amman. The objective of the training in Amman was not clearly defined and necessary permits were not prepared in advance. The training agenda therefore had to be modified as Jordan authorities did not permit any visit to a border point such as intended. The participants therefore perceived and referred to the Amman training as purely theoretical, leaving them without practical and necessary tools for implementation of the manuals.

Following gap analysis and initial training of some 20 food processing enterprises, 6 of these SMEs were finally selected and supported towards meeting the requirements of HACCP/ISO 22000. Staff capacity was strengthened in relevant fields and two out of six were supported with required equipment and instruments. By the end of March 2018 all 6 companies had been audited and were recommended for certification. The sustainability of outputs is however at risk and depends on complex issues such as the enforcement of the food safety

and public health laws, on controlling the border and on legal registration of illegal domestic competitors.

3.2 Progress towards impact

In light of the project's comparatively short duration (six years - five initially planned and one year no-cost extension) it is premature to expect strong and obvious progress towards impact. There are however a few signs of such progress, which are discussed below.

3.2.1 Behavioural change

The project has contributed to laying a basis for advancing economic competitiveness. A quality infrastructure policy and regulatory framework which is supportive to the beginnings of a functioning trade facilitation was approved by the Iraqi government in late 2017. The approved NRQP complies with international best practices and with the WTO TBT and SPS world trade agreements. The project has further succeeded in achieving increased national knowledge and confidence, together with regional inclusion and enhanced international recognition. Previously Iraqi companies were confined to conformity assessment services from neighbouring countries. With the national accreditation system (IQAS) in place, clients are already turning to IQAS for these services, thus reducing their costs for these services with maintained recognition of results.

Although environmental concerns were not explicitly considered in the design of the project, the eventual implementation of the NRQP policy and access to accreditation services may be expected to positively contribute to safeguarding the environment through applying standards, tools of conformity assessment procedures and through reducing the use of non-complying products. To the extent that safeguarding the environment is perceived as an issue of importance to UNIDO projects, these aspects would need to be integrated also into the monitoring framework of future similar projects. It is further to be expected that as the foreseen economic development 'picks up' environmental pressure may also 'pick up', requiring integrated attention to environmental sustainability.

In the design phase there were no requirements to pay attention to whether or not the project might contribute to creating shared prosperity in Iraq. The project however expects to contribute to enhanced consumer protection as one result.

3.2.2 Broader adoption

At the time of this terminal evaluation there was no evidence to suggest that project results had been incorporated into broader stakeholder mandates or initiatives and equally no evidence of replication of project results. As mentioned above, it would also be premature to expect such broader results at this point in time given that the project was to end only after the terminal evaluation took place.

The conformity assessment services are however feasible for future replication across more sectors in the Iraqi economy. The food safety/food control system component on the other hand is not feasible for replication unless it is considerably redesigned based on lessons learned from this project.

4. Project's quality and performance

4.1 Design

The full set of project planning documents include: i) original project document (2012); ii) inception report (end 2012) with Monitoring and Evaluation Guide (including monitoring plan), and two cross-cutting manuals (on good governance and gender); iii) food safety extension document (2014); and iv) bridging document (2016).

The original project document was designed for a planned duration of 4.5 years (including an inception phase of 6 months). In the project document the gaps and needs to be addressed were clearly defined, and the components proposed to address these gaps and needs were consistent with the priorities of Iraq. The project intervention logic followed what should be expected from a modern approach to supporting SMTQ, and its design with main focus on technical solutions, capacity development and policy formulation remained valid also in the context of escalating conflict in Iraq. The original logframe was revised considerably to the better during the inception phase (completed with the endorsement of the Inception Report in November 2012). The revised logframe more clearly outlined the expected chain of results, in particular the distinction between outcomes and outputs. In the revised logframe there is clear description of expected long-term change, and the expected outcomes describe a change in behaviour and performance of the key institutions, with outputs describing deliverables expected from the project support (for outcomes 1-5 in the final project document, with outcome 6 added later as seen from the next paragraph). One weakness is however found in the identified indicators (seen from the monitoring framework attached to the inception report), which are all quantitative and were selected from UNIDO's Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system. Some indicators at outcome level are even replicate of quantitative indicators at output level (one example: Outcome 1 and output 1.1). There are further no time-bound targets against which to assess progress during implementation (neither at output nor at outcome levels), although the importance of this is referred to in the monitoring and evaluation guide.³ It is consequently difficult to assess for instance degree of effectiveness from progress reporting, and the impression is that indicators are more 'activity-driven' than 'results-oriented'.

The original project document did however not include the food safety component (outcome 6), which was added two years into project implementation (as seen above, section 1.5.3), and for which there is no evidence to show that the design was technically adequate to address the identified gaps and needs. The intended outcome - to achieve an effective food control system adjusted/adapted to international best practices - was over-ambitious given that implementation of this component was to start with only 2 years left of the planned project duration. Its design further involved a multi-stakeholder Committee for Food Safety, expected to be fully operational and well integrated in international and regional networks/platforms. In the Iraqi context, with acknowledged limited enforcement of cross-governmental coordination it would be challenging to achieve a fully operational multi-stakeholder committee, and particularly within a comparatively short period of time. The intended inception phase for this

³ The SMART criteria are referred to in the monitoring and evaluation guide: specific – measurable – achievable – realistic – time-bound.

component was eventually cancelled by the project management following discussions and decisions during the third project SC meeting (8-9 January 2015). During this SC meeting it was firstly decided to omit the planned food safety output 6.1 in order to avoid overlapping and conflicting with the implementation of the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) Law which had recently been adopted by the Parliament. MoP further nominated COSQC as the main focal point also for the food safety component, to hold responsibility for coordination and communication with Ministries of Agriculture and Health. The project management had good knowledge of COSQC as counterpart and the three remaining food safety outputs were perceived by the project management as being clearly defined in scope. It was therefore decided to proceed directly with the analysis to identify gaps in technical and human capacity of the selected border control points, enterprises and laboratories. The resulting upgrading roadmaps then formed the work plan for the main implementation phase during the actual upgrading work was taken up. The decision to omit food safety output 6.1 was unfortunate as the intended more in-depth contextual analysis might have resulted in a revised and possibly more adequate design of the food safety component, with more attention being paid to required institutional structures than what resulted. The logframe for the food safety component is further less clear in causal relationship between outputs and outcomes.

Project implementation was decided to be under the overall management of UNIDO, but with sub-contracting partnership arrangement with Swedac for the accreditation component (outcome 2) and with UNCTAD for the WTO component (outcome 3). Following the signing of the contract between UNIDO and Sida, UNIDO therefore entered into agreements with UNCTAD and Swedac further defining the precise scope of their respective involvement.

In its overall management function UNIDO would provide support to all three implementing partners (UNIDO, Swedac, and UNCTAD). The project was set up with overall management responsibility resting with UNIDO HQ in Vienna, a Technical Support Unit (TSU) in Amman, and a logistics and liaison officer in Baghdad. The project thereby followed a project set up which had been applied also for previous projects implemented by UNIDO in Iraq. The SC provided strategic guidance to the implementation of the project.

4.2 Relevance

The original project was designed in a period where expectations of continued peaceful development in Iraq were high. Within this context the project was highly relevant regarding expected results and was well aligned with Iraq's development priorities, UNIDO's mandate, technical expertise and comparative advantages, as well as with the donor's priorities.⁴

During the project duration, as unfortunate events of an increasing conflict situation unfolded, the project was in effect implemented in the midst of a period when Iraq went from finding itself in a 'post-conflict' situation to being pushed into an outright 'conflict' situation, forced to respond to the ISIS attacks on the country. Nevertheless, the project showed ability to continue implementation of planned activities, albeit at times at a slower pace and with more attention having to be diverted to security aspects. At present, with 'restored peace', the project is again highly relevant to the Iraqi government and remains relevant also to UNIDO.

4 Sweden's strategy for development cooperation with Iraq 2009-2014' (June 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden).

The Iraqi government expects the private sector to be leading economic development in 10 years time; viewing private sector development and employment generation as indispensable aspects of the Government's efforts to rehabilitate the economy, to improve livelihoods of the citizen, and to restore 'social fabric'. From the donor's view, however, the project no longer remains as directly relevant as when designed, given the most recent Swedish strategy for development cooperation with Iraq.⁵ Indirectly, however, in light of the project's focus on supporting employment generation through private sector development the project may still include some relevant aspects also to the donor.

In particular the national quality policy, standardization and metrology component together with the accreditation component have proven to having applied a technical solution adequately adapted to address the gaps to be filled, while simultaneously taking advantage of emerging opportunities. In the process of developing the national quality policy, the project managed to achieve an insight into the need to also revise the technical regulation system (not planned for). The independent accreditation system (IQAS) was formed at a quicker pace than anticipated, thus resulting in a considerably higher than planned number of testing/calibration laboratories being accredited already within the project's lifetime. The technical approach taken within the WTO component also proved adequate, as evidenced by the submission of the updated MFTR.

On the other hand, the food safety component, as designed and revised during project duration, can unfortunately not be assessed as an adequate technical solution to the development problem of unsafe food to consumers in the current Iraqi consumer context. The inception period was cancelled, during which it had been expected to undertake a more in-depth contextual analysis to agree on how best to work with and across Government on enforcement aspects (see section 3.1. above). Instead, focus was immediately turned to the technical upgrading of selected border control points, enterprises and laboratories. Technical capacity support in terms of training and equipment was provided, with little attention paid to the context within which these technical solutions are to be applied. This approach unfortunately contributed to a considerable decrease of the overall relevance of this component, particularly from a sustainability perspective, as the intended in-depth study to better understand the complex context within which food safety was to be strengthened was omitted.

Pure technical solutions – regardless of how effectively they may be delivered - are rarely sufficient to fulfil intentions of contributing to changing complex systems, such as the food control system. The support provided to six Iraqi food producing SMEs with equipment and capacity development may have served a purpose to allow COSQC to gain practical experience from food safety certification processes. No evidence was however provided to suggest that the main aim to increase the competitiveness of the selected pilot enterprises has been achieved, or that the project's approach was a relevant technical solution to achieve tangible results when it comes to the intended outcome of ensuring an effective food control system. Similarly, giving up on efforts to achieve required coordination across government ministries implies that the manual for border inspection will most likely not be implemented. Without enforcement mechanisms the food and drugs law will not serve its intended purpose of providing consumer protection, i.e. to stop inflow of imported unsafe food products and to

5 Sweden's strategy for development cooperation with Iraq 2017-2021' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden)

stop domestic illegal production of unsafe food products, and will thereby also not contribute to providing a business environment in Iraq conducive to food safety in production.

4.3 Efficiency

UNIDO's internal financial management has worked efficiently, with transactions between UNIDO HQ and the TSU in Amman being done through UNIDO's own bank account in Amman.

The total project budget contributed by Sida, comprising budget agreed in the original project document plus the agreed food safety extension budget, amounted to USD 12 232 558 (excl. 10% support costs). The two agreements between the Sida and UNIDO were however signed in SEK, and the budgeted USD equivalents were thus based on the exchange rates prevailing at the time of signing the respective agreement. The agreed budget was disbursed by Sida in 6 instalments between January 2012 and March 2015. Due to exchange rate fluctuations, the budget for project activities was in effect reduced to USD 11 363 660, reflecting actual exchange rate losses of USD 868 898.

The expected outcomes from components were revised rather considerably during the inception review of the project document, with the food control system component being added later. It is consequently not possible, as also seen from Table 2, to compare expected outcomes in the original project document against budget and time frame.

Table 2: Comparison of outcomes in original project document vs. revised following inception (with final budget⁶)

Original Project Document	<i>Revised Project Document following Inception – and Final Budget per revised outcome (USD)</i>	
Outcome 1: The National Quality framework of Iraq (policy, strategy and strategic action plan) developed, endorsed and promoted. A High Level Committee for Quality Infrastructure established and capable to advocate and manage the national quality framework	Outcome 1: <i>Adapted to the new principles of the international trade regime, the Iraqi quality system (i.e. legal framework and infrastructure) is effective in promoting trade and in improving consumer protection, and national institutions competent in advocating and managing the national quality system.</i>	3 095 860 (27.1%)
Outcome 2: The National Accreditation Organization established, operational and regionally /internationally recognized	Outcome 2: <i>Conformity assessment services (i.e. testing, certification, inspection), accredited by a regionally and internationally recognized independent Iraqi Accreditation Body, are offered on the market.</i>	3 764 592 (33.2%)
Outcome 3: The National Metrology System developed and strengthened to support the national accreditation body. The Laboratory Department of COSQC promoted to take the role of, and eventually become, the National Metrology Institute (NMI) of Iraq	Outcome 3: <i>Enhanced national trade policy framework fostering progress in the WTO accession process.</i>	741 141 (6.5%)
Outcome 4: The COSQC 's capacities as the national standardization organization for standards and technical regulations strengthened following international best practices	Outcome 4: <i>Effective coordination and management of the project</i>	1 892 668 (16.7%)

Outcome 5: The conformity assessment capacities of COSQC's Quality Control Directorate strengthened and supported with the aim of supporting the national market surveillance	Outcome 5: <i>Effective monitoring, evaluation and governance of the project, including security support</i>	391 872 (3.5%)
Outcome 6: Trade policies and trade negotiation capabilities of the Government of Iraq strengthened	Outcome 6: <i>Adapted to international best practices, the Iraqi food control system is effective.</i>	1 277 296 (11.2%)
	<i>Inception Phase</i>	200 231 (1.8%)
	Total	11 363 660

In this evaluation the achievement of revised results will be assessed only against expected results and their associated budgets and time frames as agreed following the inception review. Therefore final budget allocations for expected revised results are seen from Table 2 whereas the initial budget distribution across the components in the original budget are not included).

The project's time frame has been revised twice; a no-cost extension covering 2017 followed by an additional 3-months extension (from January-March 2018) to allow for the terminal evaluation to be conducted. Within the revised time frame the project shows an overall a comparatively high degree of implementation efficiency, particularly taking into account the deteriorating security situation during the project duration. Results have also been achieved within the overall approved budget. Several re-allocations of funds, and certain revisions of expected results – both up-sized (e.g. number of labs being upgraded) and down-sized (e.g. deleted output together with more narrow focus of other outputs within food control system component) were however undertaken during implementation (approved by the SC).

The sub-contracting partnership arrangements with Swedac (accreditation component) and UNCTAD (WTO component) have worked efficiently, to mutual benefit of stakeholders. An alternative option would have been for Sida to enter into two additional bilateral contracts with Swedac/UNCTAD respectively, which would most likely have been less efficient given that neither Swedac nor UNCTAD had field representation. From UNIDO's perspective the sub-contracting arrangement has been efficient in enhancing transparency across components, and thus allowed stronger coordination of required activities within each component.

The Government's contributions were agreed to be in kind, and Government has overall provided adequate inputs as planned. In most cases sufficient staff of an appropriate professional level and seniority has been available during the project. In a few cases staff continuity was perceived as an issue which was thereafter addressed by the national counterpart. The national counterpart has covered direct operational expenses, such as staff salaries, in-country workshop administration and logistics, and COSQC has also financed a new building to which to move part of its offices in order to allow space to host the formed independent accreditation body (IQAS) in the old building. COSQC also secured funds for buying some additional equipment. At a time COSQC had difficulties in release of allocated government funds, which did however in the end not impact on implementation.

A large share of UNIDO's inputs had to be procured through centralized formal tendering procedures which are at times bureaucratic and time-consuming, and the provision of agreed equipment was in some instances delayed. In addition, in-transparent and time-consuming Iraqi custom procedures at times caused suppliers waiting 1-3 months for required tax and duty exemption letters. Delays also occurred due to other factors beyond the control of the project management, such as selected suppliers announcing that they could not deliver or requesting extending delivery time by nine months, resulting in a need to select a new supplier. The quality was not always entirely up to the standards envisioned by the winning tenderer, which would require additional time to be spent in order to solve inadequacies discovered only upon delivery of the equipment. For experts visa and/or security issues occurred which may have delayed the fielding of a selected expert.

One core aspect of the project has been to provide human capacity development. COSQC had expressed their strong preference that experts should come to Baghdad and work with them on the ground. UNIDO has largely managed to fulfil the requirement to provide trainings in-country and at work sites. Having experts going to Iraq to work on the sites with the staff was an efficient solution (which also contributed to enhanced effectiveness, particularly in the upgrading of laboratories). Although it is expensive sending technical experts to Iraq, it would have been even more expensive to perform all trainings outside of Iraq. The project has administered the competitive procurement of a total of 167 international experts, performing some 1 120 workdays in-country. The actual cost level for these experts falls considerably below for instance EU cost criteria. The requirement to have experts coming to Iraq did decrease the basis for selection, as few experts from outside the region would apply (90% of expertise for providing capacity development services were regionally recruited (based on international tendering). The more narrow 'de-facto' basis for selection of experts has however not decreased the quality of capacity development, but it has contributed to decreasing language barriers and to enhance regional networking. The quality of expertise provided by UNIDO has generally been assessed as good by project stakeholders. The project has thus been financially efficient in addition to technically efficient in its implementation.

COSQC did however make an exception to the expectation of having experts travelling to Baghdad for Swedac. It was known already during the design phase that Swedac for security reasons was allowed to send staff members only to the Kurdistan region of Iraq. Swedac is internationally well respected within its field, which was seen as important by COSQC as well as for UNIDO in order to gain regional and international acknowledgement of the independent Iraqi accreditation unit (IQAS) to be established through the project support. In addition COSQC had previous good experiences and relationships with Swedac. Several staff members had participated in the International Training Program (ITPs) conducted by Swedac which had created high level of trust in Swedac's expertise within COSQC. One training was held by Swedac in Erbil before the security situation deteriorated also in Kurdistan. Thereafter, COSQC staff had to be brought to Swedac in Sweden to sit with relevant Arab-speaking expertise within Swedac to jointly perform work tasks such as reviewing every required document prepared by COSQC.

4.4 Sustainability

An exit strategy has not been formally agreed between UNIDO and the national counterparts. A summary of activities which were seen as vital to ensure sustainability of project results was however presented by UNIDO and discussed with the national counterparts during a final SC meeting (December 2017), in which the Minister of MoP also participated.

The sustainability of project results in general depends critically on the enforcement of approved laws and regulations, on enforcing coordination and collaboration across relevant government ministries, on establishing and implementing the required mechanisms/tools to ensure required commitment, on building trust between the different stakeholders and gaining proper engagement of all relevant parties in the process of policy implementation, in addition to the availability of national budget. It will also be crucial for Iraq to sustain international memberships and recognitions. In this respect, it also deserves to be emphasized that this

project lasted only for 6 years, whereas a standard time frame for a similar project support would be 10 years.

For the NRQP enforcement there is certain likelihood/risk that government structures and processes will jeopardize the sustainability. The NRQP has so far been slow in being enforced, with an outspoken lack of required trust between vital stakeholders. COSQC management however expects continued knowledge sharing by upgraded laboratories. IQAS is expected to get full ILAC approval within short, which will enhance prospects for sustainability. IQAS further emphasized that they were functioning also before the new law was approved, while the law has helped legally to establish them as an independent body, now located in a building separate from the laboratories. A complication for IQAS is that it is a new agency and the budget proposal for 2018 was submitted before its establishment. A request has however been sent to the Parliament and IQAS is convinced that they will get budget for 2018. Further, now they have access to Iraqi assessors and thus do not need to use expensive expertise from region as previously. Sustainability for metrology is less certain as it remains unclear how they in the medium term will manage to update standards as required.

In support of sustainability there is strong commitment among key stakeholders, with a visible change of mind in staff of COSQC and IQAS. Recent steps taken include the approval by the Minister of Planning to send a letter to the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers to request that laboratories accredit 80% of tests related to health and safety. IQAS has sent a letter, signed by the Minister of Planning, to the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers requesting that for new laboratories applying for registration license, their tests related to health and safety have to be accredited by IQAS. IQAS has further requested the Ministry of Petroleum to build the capacities of all laboratories, in cooperation with IQAS, for them to be ready for accreditation. A final request has been sent to the Basra Council to only accept the participation of accredited laboratories in government tendering processes. The project has further managed to enhance awareness and understanding also outside of COSQC and IQAS about the merits of QI is about.

There are further on-going and proactive efforts to reach a solution about how to secure funding for sustaining COSQC and IQAS from the national budget. The likelihood/risk that

financial resources will not be available once the project ends is however not negligible, even in light of the 'risk management efforts' being made by the national stakeholders to secure financial support from the national budget.

There is an equally strong commitment within the WTO accession negotiation team to keep up work and to exploit the momentum created thanks to the support from UNCTAD. One further step was taken in February when the MFTR was submitted to the WTO.

For the food safety component the complete lack of contextual alignment works strongly against institutionalization of outputs and results. While it is possible that upgraded labs will continue to work according to new standards the indispensable border control coordination/collaboration across ministries has not been achieved. It also remains to be seen if upgraded SMEs will continue its safer food production with higher production costs than their competitors, without being able to increase prices given the continued poorly functioning of food safety control in Iraq. Increased market shares for safe food products are not likely within the foreseeable future given the continued stage of 'porous' borders with largely uncontrolled inflow of uncontrolled food products together with continued overwhelming domestic production of cheaper unsafe food products from hundreds of domestic SME food producers.

4.5 Gender mainstreaming

In general across stakeholders, reference is made to the fact that the share of women is high across stakeholders and institutions supported by the project. Gender mainstreaming is thereby largely reduced to be about 'number of women participating in training activities', which is also the only gender equality aspect included in the project's monitoring framework. This view deviates rather strongly from the intentions expressed in the Gender Manual that was developed during the inception phase (2012). When the Gender Manual was presented (as part of the inception report) to the first SC meeting (November 2012) the meeting notes clarify that it was cautioned 'to take into consideration the gradual application of' the Gender Manual (as well as of the Governance Manual, see next section). No part of the Gender Manual was thereafter been implemented.

Notwithstanding, the food safety extension project document in 2014 again reiterates the strong commitment to gender mainstreaming.⁶ During the evaluation, no evidence was found to suggest any efforts to implement any of the intentions elaborated in the food safety extension document.

In the bridging document (in 2016) reference is instead to an ongoing regional food safety project under which an expert has been recruited specifically for addressing gender issues, and to initiate partnership with the Centre of Arab Woman for Training and Research (CAWTAR) in order to address and assess the impact of the regional program on gender mainstreaming in a more comprehensive manner. No evidence was found to indicate that this had in any way spilled over to the food safety component of this bilateral project. Assumedly this would have been the intention given the inclusion of this information in the bridging document.

6 Pages 21-22.

Overall, gender mainstreaming has not been a strength of the project – despite well-formulated intentions in project documentation and the effort to develop the Gender Manual for the project. No visible results, or even efforts to achieve results, regarding gender mainstreaming were found during the evaluation. The project management acknowledges that the gender manual was not followed through. This is unfortunate, particularly in light of UNIDO’s internal expressed intentions to strengthen gender equality mainstreaming across interventions.⁷

4.6 Good governance

A Governance Manual was developed during the inception period (together with the Gender Manual). As discussed above, in the first SC meeting notes it is stated that a gradual application of the good governance manual (together with the gender manual) must be taken into consideration. No evidence was provided during the evaluation to suggest that any part of the Governance Manual had been implemented. The project management confirms that good governance was not treated as a ‘stand-alone’ but training material and trainings did include good governance aspects such as ‘impartiality’ and ‘anti-corruption’. Therefore, while the project has contributed to strengthening the Government’s capacity, the project has only marginally adhered to a good governance approach in the implementation process.

A relevant aspect of good governance would be to have transparency through a stronger participatory approach when formulating policies, guidelines, etc., such as reaching out more strongly to raise awareness among stakeholders also outside of the formulation committee itself. Awareness raising together with knowledge generation is also one of the identified necessary preconditions in order to achieve the change to follow from the project support (see ToC above). It was also in retrospect reflected upon by one stakeholder that s/he would have put more emphasis on awareness raising among enterprises and in the community while being in the process of formulating the national quality policy, as s/he believed that would have helped gain broader understanding from private sector as well as from the general public of why it needed to be put in place, and which would be the benefits to the consumers. This, it was reflected, might in turn have facilitated its enforcement. Currently, enforcement and gaining trust from private sector remains to be seen.

7 Resources and guidance within UNIDO include for instance: ‘Policy on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (2009-2015)’, and the updated ‘The Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women Strategy 2016-2019’. In 2015, UNIDO also formally published a ‘Guide on Gender Mainstreaming. Trade Capacity-Building Projects’.

5. Performance of partners

The Steering Committee (SC) has been responsible for overseeing the project work planning, implementation and progress, and for providing strategic directions for the project. The SC's responsibilities included to review and approve annual progress reports, work plans and budgets. The SC was formed by the Ministry of Planning (MoP) and included members from all relevant Iraqi government bodies involved in project implementation. UNIDO and the Donor were invited to all SC meetings, while partners (UNCTAD and Swedac) were invited to participate in discussions related to their respective components. From the Minutes of Meetings (MoMs) strategic decisions by the SC are documented. Overall, the SC has functioned acceptably well in its capacity, although presence in meetings has not always been as extensive as intended (including from Donor side).

5.1 UNIDO

Project management has established clear lines for reporting and of authority with division of responsibilities between the project staff in UNIDO HQ and the TSU in Amman. UNIDO does not have an official office in Iraq but the project recruited an officer to be based in Baghdad to support in logistics around travel, administration and finance, under the daily supervision of the international project coordinator located in the TSU in Amman, which has also functioned smoothly. In particular, when the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system became accessible to all UNIDO staff, regardless of location, transparency about decisions and actions taken increased, which further enabled the project staff to support and back-up each other.

The Iraqi counterparts confirm their appreciation of the performance of the UNIDO project staff (in Baghdad, TSU Amman and HQ). In particular reference is made UNIDO's ability to identify and recruit good experts who have been willing to travel to Iraq, thus meeting a strict requirement from the main project counterpart (COSQC) that capacity development and trainings should take place in-country to allow direct linkages to workplaces. A review of recruited expertise shows that 90% were recruited from the region, which contributes to an easy transfer of knowledge with limited language barriers. The regional networking that may follow was yet another advantage of recruiting regional expertise. At the same time, the requirement of having experts travelling to Iraq has limited the basis for recruiting expertise as few outside the region has showed interest in participating in tendering processes. One aspect raised was however that it would have been preferred to have a formal UNIDO office within Iraq. This is however an issues which no individual project can decide on.

It was noted that from the outset of the project UNIDO was supposed to provide transfer of knowledge only, and very limited equipment. COSQC however convinced UNIDO that certain strategic equipment was needed in order to allow the application of new knowledge to the laboratory staff and thereby to actually achieve the intended level of upgrade of laboratories. There is strong appreciation of UNIDO's efforts to meet this requirement within the budget limits, and without compromising the quality of expertise. The decision to allow selected equipment to be included in the project was taken by the SC.

In effectuating the procurement of agreed equipment, the national partners perceived UNIDO as 'too bureaucratic' with lengthy and time-consuming procurement processes. Although a few Iraqi companies (representing international companies) in Iraq participated in tendering, it is perceived that the requirement to provide tenders through UNIDO's electronic procurement system in general works against the participation of Iraqi companies, as they do not yet have sufficient knowledge and experience to easily manage UNIDO's electronic system. It was seen as beneficial to have had Iraqi representation of suppliers as this would have facilitated follow-up to check the quality of delivered equipment. UNIDO acknowledges that few Iraqi companies participated in tendering processes, but also points to the fact that most then fell short in the evaluation process due to unusually costly quotations.

The sub-contracting partnerships between UNIDO and Swedac and UNTAC respectively have been highly valued during implementation by the three partners as well as by national stakeholders. Both UNCTAD and Swedac expressed their satisfaction with field support provided by UNIDO in implementing activities assigned to them. The two sub-contracted partners in particular appreciated the flexibility and high degree of commitment from UNIDO to address emerging challenges in order to facilitate implementation also when the security situation in Iraq deteriorated. UNCTAD emphasized that should the opportunity present itself UNCTAD would be interested in co-operating with UNIDO again in a future project on a similar basis as within this project. Swedac's reflections were that for any future sub-contracting arrangements with UNIDO Swedac would be cautious to ensure stronger focus on institutional cooperation with national stakeholders. From Swedac's perspective the extent and selection of activities eventually assigned to Swedac by UNIDO fell considerably short of meeting expectations raised within Swedac from initial discussions with both UNIDO and Sida.

5.2 National counterparts

While UNIDO took main responsibility for the project formulation, the main national partner (COSQC) has been actively involved in all phases of the design as well as in the implementation process. COSQC has shown strong commitment and has taken actions as agreed in discussions within SC meetings and/or with the project management. There is strong mutual trust between UNIDO and COSQC involved staff members.

Overall, COSQC has managed to deliver its support as per agreements, and has taken corrective measures in the few cases where bottlenecks have arisen. At times the national partner has – for understandable reasons – been preoccupied with pressing issues such as personal security due to increased level of conflict in the country, no electricity to laboratories, etc. which has at times slowed down required actions and responses. The understanding of some UNIDO administrative requirements has increased over time. UNIDO experienced slight but manageable weaknesses in reporting and documentation from the national partner's side, including delays in procedures originating from the long processing times of required tax and duty exemption letters. Communication between Iraq and Amman has been a challenge at both ends due to problematic telecommunications, although it improved over time.

The national counterpart has as per agreement funded all participating staff as well as other project operational costs in Iraq, such as venues for trainings. However, in the national budget priority was shifted to finance the fight against ISIS, implying a temporary cut across

government to only cover basic costs. This had implications for agreed national project investments, with national funds to buy equipment and rehabilitate laboratories no longer being available. However, the recent new building to which to move some COSQC offices in order to free space in the old building to host the independent IQAS and all testing laboratories has been funded by the government as planned.

The inclusion of members from all participating Iraqi government institutions was expected to enhance trust, inter-organizational co-ordination and cooperation through the use of workshops and SC meetings. This seems however not to have been sufficient in order to achieve trust and cooperation across participating ministries. In particular the food safety component suffered from weak counterpart cross-ministerial coordination. In the end it was agreed to lower the scale of the food safety intervention to focus on developing an inspection manual for use at border control points, and on building capacity and rehabilitating selected laboratories. It was ensured that all Ministries concerned with sample testing at border control points benefited from upgrading support to at least one of their laboratories. Enforcement aspects regarding the border control component were however left aside, which did in the implementation process turn out to pose a problem; a problem which might have been avoided had the initially intended in-depth study not been omitted together with omitting the inception phase. Throughout the project it seems that partners outside of MoP perceived a continued lack of transparency in that information was given them only indirectly through the main project partner (MoP).

The private sector in Iraq is rather weak and small. In discussions it further became obvious that the level of mutual trust between private sector and government is extremely low in today's Iraq. There has thus not been a strong basis for private sector involvement in the project. Invitations have not been widely spread, and private sector representatives have in general not been particularly engaged in the project.

5.3 Donor

The Donor (Sida) has been timely in disbursing funds, which has facilitated UNIDO's own smooth financial management of project funds. Sida has however largely been absent in project implementation. The Sida officer involved in the design and decision making related to the project did actively participate at the outset of project implementation. There has thereafter been a high turnover of Sida officers involved in the project which has not allowed building close collaboration between UNIDO and Sida. A contributing factor to Sida's limited active participation in following-up the implementation of the project may be that the most recent Swedish country strategy for cooperation with Iraq (decided in 2014) has turned Swedish focus away from economic development to interventions aimed at contributing to restoring and rehabilitating the devastated post-conflict situation in Iraq. The adoption of this country strategy also led to the closure of the Iraq unit at Sida HQ.

6. Factors facilitating or limiting the achievements of results

6.1 Monitoring and evaluation

The planned mid-term review did not take place, but an external assessment was conducted in 2016 in response to a request from the donor prior to planning the bridging phase later on in 2016. Overall, the regular progress monitoring has however functioned well. Cross-cutting issues, such as gender equality mainstreaming and good governance, were however not adequately addressed in progress monitoring and reporting.

The monitoring and evaluation plan attached to the inception report was formulated by an external consultant and was eventually revised by the project management together with the monitoring officer located in the TSU in Amman. Regular progress reporting was thereafter carried out against the logframe and in line with the revised monitoring and evaluation plan.

A risk assessment and mitigation plan was developed during the inception phase, and subsequently included and update in progress reporting. The security situation remained a 'moving target' throughout project implementation and constantly required project management to decide on implementation re-adjustments to address emerging security issues. Security risk assessments were performed as an integral part of the progress monitoring.

Project internal risks were also assessed, such as risk of non-performing experts and/or trainers. The requested mission reports from the experts were frequently late and did not cover sufficient information to monitor progress in performing their tasks. Over time the monitoring officer therefore developed a template with requested mission reporting standards, including information about for instance number of trainees, topics covered, etc. To validate the information provided by the experts the information was cross-referenced with the previously prepared agenda and with information gathered from the questionnaires filled out by the trainees, and information published at COSQCs website.

6.2 Results-based management

The selected indicators are all quantitative with strong focus of what is to follow from project activities: number of trainees trained, number of laws formulated, number of policies developed, etc. for outputs as well as for outcomes. Baselines are consequently set at 'zero' reflecting that at the project outset none of the activities had yet been implemented. This however also implicitly carries along an assumption that no previous capacity strengthening had taken place, although for instance it is known from project

outset that COSQC has previously participated in trainings delivered by Swedac. Targets attached to the indicators are moreover not time-bound, and therefore did not lend themselves to results-based management as implementation progressed (as discussed above under design). In effect, the selected indicators reflect monitoring of activities rather than of results. Given the strong focus on institutional capacity development, results indicators would have needed to be qualitative, and results would have needed to be measured against level of institutional capacity when the project ended as compared to level of institutional capacity when the project started. The project management acknowledged this to certain extent but also emphasized that qualitative indicators would have required additional monitoring staff for follow up at both output and outcome levels.

Certain results-based management did however take place in practice at the activity level. So for instance would training manuals be adapted to reflect feed back from trainees. Satisfaction among trainees has overall been followed carefully, and corrective measures have been taken to replace a trainer in cases of consistent dissatisfaction among trainees. Complaints from trainees were addressed through discussions with counterparts. Whenever serious issues were extracted from trainee questionnaires the project management was alerted to bring it up for discussion with the director general of the respective component. More strategic issues were thereafter raised in SC meetings. Given the large amount of trainings within the project this has been an important issue to achieve satisfactory individual capacity development results. Actions were also promptly taken to address security issues as well as other project internal emerging risks, such as potential turnover of key staff in counterpart institutions.

Adequate corrective measures that might have resulted in a higher degree of results-achievement within the food control system component were not taken. Coordination and cooperation across the three participating ministries remained weak throughout the project duration. No evidence was provided that the inspector training course in Amman which was planned in response to experienced difficulties to achieve collaboration and coordination across involved Ministries around border control was of value. The intended exposure to a border point in Jordan did not materialize and the training was confined to class room training sessions.

6.3 Other factors

Worsening security situation: One obvious factor working against the achievement of results is the unfortunate change of the project's context - with Iraq going from a 'post-conflict' situation into an 'outright conflict' situation. The deteriorating security situation is also reflected in the project's progress reporting. One effect was, as discussed above, the government's cut of national budget expenses to a minimum across government in order to free money to finance its defending itself against ISIS. The deteriorating security situation further affected the willingness of experts to travel to Iraq as well as the mental well-being of the national counterpart staff. In this respect, the project's results achievements must be seen as a success; a success which could happen only thanks to the very strong personal commitment of involved staff from the national partners

throughout all phases of the project in spite of serious security problems. UNIDO's flexibility in re-allocating some budget to ensure appropriate upgrading of laboratories was equally crucial.

Value added from linkages with regional project: the bilateral UNIDO-COSQC project and the regional UNIDO-AIDMO project (supporting ARAC to implement the Regional Quality Infrastructure Strategy, targeting the regional cooperation in accreditation as the main focus) each had their own separate project document and budget. In neither of these two project documents is there an expressed intended intention to establish direct linkages between the two projects. The fact that Iraq/COSQC is included as a stakeholder in the regional AIDMO project has however proven to have mutually benefited both projects: participation in ARAC committees has facilitated knowledge sharing with Iraq no loner being 'left behind' in accessing knowledge, which has proven to be an indirect factor working to speed up progress of establishing IQAS as an independent accreditation body in Iraq, while simultaneously the success till date in establishing IQAS in Iraq has served as a 'model' for other participating Arab countries which do not yet have an independent accreditation body; IQAS was formed just a few years ago but are already actively seen in the regional context. With the bilateral UNIDO managed Iraq project coming to an end, the AIDMO-UNIDO Project (supported by Sida), which will continue its current support to ARAC under a forthcoming Phase II, provides an opportunity for UNIDO to search for options to support IQAS to achieve full international recognition, particularly in case there will be no ILAC approval of IQAS before the bilateral project ends (end March 2017). In this respect is deserves to be acknowledged that the bilateral project has lasted only 5 years, whereas most such projects do have a time-frame of 10 years of support.

Partnerships with UNCTAD and Swedac: UNIDO sub-contracted UNCTAD and Swedac as implementing partners, in agreement with pre-project discussions held with Sida. Another option would have been for Sida to enter into bilateral contracts with each of the two sub-contracted partners. For Swedac, Sida would typically go for a 'twinning' arrangement between Swedac and the Iraqi corresponding body. The sub-contracting arrangement has proven beneficial during implementation; it has provided the two sub-contracted partners with access to field logistics support, contributed to enhanced transparency and coordination across all project components, and made stakeholders more accountability to the project as a whole. In the view of UNIDO these strategic partnerships further contributed to the best utilization of the right expertise in a cost-efficient manner. Swedac on the other hand perceives that there should have been a stronger emphasis on institutional cooperation, such as would have happened in case of a 'twinning' arrangement.

6.4 Overarching assessment and rating table

UNIDO Independent Evaluation Division uses a six-point rating system, where 6 is the highest score (highly satisfactory) and 1 is the lowest (highly unsatisfactory). The assessment rating is seen from Table 3. It deserves to be noted that overall the rating was negatively influenced by the poor performance of the food safety component.

Table 3: Rating Table

#	Evaluation Criteria	Score / Rating	
A	Progress toward Impact (at early stage)	3	Moderately unsatisfactory
B	Project design	4	Moderately satisfactory
1	Overall design	4	Moderately satisfactory
2	Logframe	4	Moderately satisfactory
C	Project performance	5	Satisfactory
1	Relevance	5	Satisfactory
2	Effectiveness	5	Satisfactory
3	Efficiency	5	Satisfactory
4	Sustainability of benefits	4	Moderately satisfactory
D	Cross-cutting performance criteria	3	Moderately unsatisfactory
1	Good Governance	1	Highly unsatisfactory
2	Gender mainstreaming	1	Highly unsatisfactory
3	M&E: M&E design M&E implementation	4	Moderately satisfactory
4	Results-based Management (RBM)	4	Moderately satisfactory
E	Performance of partners		Satisfactory
1	UNIDO	5	Satisfactory
2	National counterparts	5	Satisfactory
3	Donor	5	Satisfactory
F	Overall assessment	5	Satisfactory

Conclusions

The overall key conclusion is that project has been successful in reaching most of its intended outcome results. The project duration was planned for 4.5 years (including an inception phase of 6 months). A one-year no cost extension was granted, which helped achieve results. A policy and regulatory framework which is supportive to the beginnings of functioning trade facilitation has been put in place through the Government's approval of the NRQP. The established independent Iraqi Accreditation System (IQAS) is providing conformity assessment services on the market. COSQC's implementation capacities have been upgraded to meet the needs of IQAS and as the national standardization organization for implementation of the NRQP. Actual enforcement capacity however remains to be proven. The submission to WTO of the updated MFTR implies that Iraq has taken an important step forward as regards prospects for regional and international trade integration. Results within the food safety component were unfortunately considerably less successfully achieved, with only marginal contributions to improving the Iraqi food control system.

The project was for several years implemented in a conflict situation. Three crucial factors contributed to its successful implementation: strong commitment of key stakeholders throughout the implementation process; strongly committed and dedicated project management and team in HQ, in the TSU in Amman and in Baghdad; and strong partnerships among involved institutions providing technical support through the project. The chosen approach to meet national partners' request of providing the major part of technical support in-country has further proven efficient and contributed to enhanced effectiveness.

An exit strategy has not been formally agreed between UNIDO and the national counterparts. A summary of activities which are seen as vital to ensure sustainability of project results was however presented by UNIDO and discussed with the national counterparts during a final Steering Committee meeting (December 2017). In addition the availability of national budget to sustain activities, sustainability of project results depends critically on the successful enforcement of approved laws and regulations, on enforcing coordination and collaboration across relevant government ministries, on establishing and implementing required mechanisms/tools to ensure required commitment, and on building trust between the different stakeholders and thus gaining proper engagement of all relevant parties (inside as well as outside of government) in the process of policy implementation, in addition to the availability of national budget to sustain activities. It will also be crucial for Iraq to sustain international memberships and recognitions.

Recommendations

To UNIDO:

- Consider options for continuation of the project – including searching for alternative financing options. Six years is short for a project like this to show sustainable results. Stronger focus should be on enforcement aspects in case of continuation with a second phase and the food control system should be redesigned in such case.

- Ensure continued strong links between Iraq and the forthcoming second phase of regional accreditation project. In particular, support should be provided for Iraq's continued participation in regional committees.

- Acknowledge the importance of contextual analysis/factors when assessing possible results in future projects. It might be a more robust approach to 'do less' in order to ensure it is done properly. When deciding to cut out one output from a component – the contextual risk analysis should be renewed to re-validate continued relevance.

- Strengthen UNIDO's internal enforcement mechanisms to ensure gender equality is mainstreamed in practice in projects and programs. Gender mainstreaming should be an integral part of project design and not seen as something to add on during inception or at a later stage. For this specific project, and in case funding is secured for a continuation, the progress on gender equality mainstreaming claimed in the on-going ARAC-UNIDO regional project should be exploited also for Iraq.

- Review / rethink UNIDO standard indicators in ERP to become conducive for results-based management – at outcome and output levels. In discussions with project management several qualitative, more relevant indicators were proposed, but as they were not included in the ERP they could not be eligible. Clearly distinguish between output and outcome level indicators.

To the Government of Iraq:

- Consider additional viable measures to strengthen enforcement capacities in order to ensure implementation of policies, laws, and/or regulations developed through the project, subsequently approved by relevant bodies of the Government of Iraq.

- Consider additional viable measures to strengthen coordination and collaboration across Ministries in order to reinforce the development results of projects requiring cross-governmental involvement. So for instance would it be indispensable to assure that relevant governmental bodies work constructively together in order to aspire at achieving food safety in Iraq.

- Ensure proper funding from national budget to sustain a national quality system., including continued participation in regional and international work. The national

metrology system and IQAS need more support to ensure sustainability and to continue to build trust in the conformity assessment services provided. Support to building a national metrology institute will contribute to building trust in the measurement system and benefit sustainability of the accreditation system.

To the Donor:

- Consider financing a second phase of selected element of the project, with stronger focus on enforcement aspects to enhance prospects for sustainability of achieved results. Continued participation in regional committees should be supported. The food control system component should be redesigned with stronger focus on consumer protection and less focus on pure technical support.

- In case of no support to a second phase - to consider if some elements of the project may be seen as aligned to the recent Swedish strategy for development cooperation with Iraq (2017-2021), and thus may merit to be formulated into a new project. Food safety would seem to be one such potential element.

- Consider more active participation in Steering Committees to ensure that important aspects are not omitted or down-played, such as happened with gender equality mainstreaming in this project, as well as with the intended strong multi-stakeholder involvement in the food control system component.

Lessons learned

The main lessons to be learned are:

- It is possible to perform long-term development cooperation also in unstable environments - such as in post-conflict/conflict. It does however require 'higher-than-normal' degree of flexibility from project management
- Providing in-country expert services is possible also in conflict/post-conflict countries. It is more efficient and effective with 'on-the-job' approach. It does however imply a heavy work load on the project team, requiring intense tendering processes, in turns requiring strongly dedicated project management and team.
- Approach to partnership with UNCTAD and Swedac has proven mutual beneficial – it enhanced management, coordination across components, stakeholder commitment and ensured logistics support for partners which do not have own field representation. This also requires a project management willing to go the 'extra mile' to provide support whenever required.
- A prerequisite for achieving results in unstable environments is strong – initial and visible - commitment from key national stakeholders, and the presence of such strong commitment should be carefully assessed before attempting to replicate in other conflict/post-conflict countries.

Annex A. Terms of Reference (Main body)

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Independent terminal evaluation of UNIDO project:

Strengthening the national quality infrastructure to facilitate trade
and enhance consumer protection

UNIDO SAP ID: 100209

October 2017

I. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT⁸

1. Project fact sheet

Project fact sheet:

Project title	Strengthening the national quality infrastructure to facilitate trade and enhance consumer protection
SAP ID	100209
Region	Western Asia
Country	Republic of Iraq
Project donor(s)	Sweden
Project approval date	6 th December 2011 by UNIDO/AMC 14 th December 2011 by Sweden 9 th July 2012 by the Minister of Planning
Project implementation start date	May 2012
Expected duration at project approval	4 years plus 6 months inception phase
Expected implementation end date	31 st December 2016
Other executing Partners	UNCTAD
Executing partners	n.a.
Donor funding	88,000,000 SEK, incl. 10% PSC
Project approval date	6 th December 2011 by UNIDO/AMC 14 th December 2011 by Sweden 9 th July 2012 by the Minister of Planning
UNIDO input (in kind, USD)	n.a.
Co-financing:	n.a.
Total project cost (USD)	
Mid-term review date:	n.a.
Planned terminal evaluation date	Q4 2017

(Source: Project document)

2. Project context

RATIONALE

Developing countries face a range of challenges stemming from weak national quality systems. These challenges range from limited access to the international trade system, to inferior and unsafe consumer goods. With the increasing globalization of markets, a robust national quality system has become critical to the international trade process, promoting a level playing field for exports, and ensuring that imports and domestically-produced goods meet internationally recognized standards.

Since the lifting of the UN sanctions in 2003, Iraq has been attempting to further trade relations with the regional and international trade community. In this regard Iraq

⁸ Data in this chapter is to be validated by the Consultant against the project document and any changes should be reflected in the evaluation report.

participated in 2007 and 2008 in two Working Party meetings to promote its WTO accession for which the Ministry of Trade is leading the process through a high level ministerial committee. This step is required to bring its trade regime at par with the multilateral international trading system.

However, throughout this time Iraqi consumers have been suffering from low quality products, commodities and household appliances since neither goods manufactured in Iraq, nor those imported from abroad, are subject to quality control standards. However, the awareness and application of quality assurance and quality control techniques in the production, the distribution and the importation of products is necessary to safeguard the public against the hazards of spoiled food and faulty appliances.

Inside Iraq it is the Central Organisation for Standards and Quality Control (COSQC) which is the central organisation with the mandate of managing the national quality system (Standards, Testing, Quality and Metrology), aiming at the strengthening of the country's trade capacities and consumer protection. However, due to limited capacities in almost all areas of its national quality infrastructure, the country is in need of technical support and capacity building to be able to properly address above mentioned challenges and to align its national quality system with the principles of the international trade regime.

ORIGIN OF THE PROJECT

In 2010, a regional programme on quality infrastructure upgrading was initiated with the financial support from the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), aiming at the implementation of the regional standardization strategy endorsed by all Arab countries through the Arab Industrial Development and Mining Organization (AIDMO). This regional initiative was the basis for identifying specific complementary national needs, and was the origin for the request made by the Ministry of Planning (MoP) to Sida and UNIDO to initiate the formulation of a full-fledged technical assistance project for upgrading Iraq's national quality system.

A follow-up meeting, organised by UNIDO with the participation of COSQC and SIDA representatives, took place on 14th June 2011 in Stockholm and resulted in the formulation of a project concept note which gained initial approval of COSQC, and SIDA requesting UNIDO's support in the formulation of a detailed project document.

Upon finalization of the design phase, within which COSQC was actively engaged, the final agreement was first signed by SIDA on 14th December 2011, and subsequently the first instalment received in UNIDO's accounts on 11th January 2012. The original implementation phase was planned to last for 4.5 years and should have come to an end on 31st December 2016.

3. Project objective:

The project "**Strengthening the National Quality Infrastructure to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Consumer Protection in Iraq**" gets implemented in partnership with the Iraqi Ministry of Planning (MoP)/Central Organization for Standardization and Quality Control (COSQC), and is funded by SIDA. The objective is to enhance the trade capacities and performance of the Republic of Iraq and to foster the country's integration into the regional and multilateral trading system. The specific objective is to upgrade the national quality infrastructure system (i.e. Accreditation, Standardization, Metrology and Conformity Assessment) in line with international best practices, in order to create the

enabling environment needed for better trade performance and consumer protection. Furthermore, the project is focusing on strengthening the national food safety control system and is supporting the Republic of Iraq in developing its quality policy which will define the reforms needed at policy, legal and institutional level.

Outcome 1: Adapted to the new principles of the international trade regime, the Iraqi quality system (i.e. legal framework and infrastructure) is effective in promoting trade and in improving consumer protection, and national institutions competent in advocating and managing the national quality system.

Outcome 2: Conformity assessment services (i.e. testing, certification, inspection) accredited by a regionally and internationally recognized independent Iraqi Accreditation Body are offered on the market.

Outcome 3: Enhanced national trade policy framework fostering progress in the WTO accession process.

Outcome 4: Effective coordination and management of the project.

Outcome 5: Effective Monitoring, Evaluation and Governance of the project.

Outcome 6: Adapted to international best practices, the Iraqi food control system is effective.

The Project is further structured into a total of 20 outputs. The full logical framework is included as annex 1.

4. Project implementation arrangements

INCEPTION PHASE

As stipulated in the approved project document, an inception phase was planned, for a maximum period of six months, with the main objective of establishing the prerequisites required for an efficient and successful project implementation. These prerequisites included mainly project logistics, recruitment of long-term project personnel, and in-depth assessments of the country's national quality infrastructure (NQI). Taking into account respective findings the project's log frame and budget were revised accordingly. Additionally, the inception phase had the objective of engaging the project stakeholders at an early stage to create a stimulus environment for project implementation.

While the inception phase was supposed to start right after the transfer of the first instalment, due to additional clarification requests received from the Minister of Planning, UNIDO was only able to start this first phase of the project in May 2012. The request was received in February 2012 and it required a meeting between Sida and MOP (April 2012), and a subsequent technical meeting between UNIDO and COSQC (15th and 16th May 2012 in Amman), to officially launch the inception phase. While the questions raised by the Ministry were actually already discussed with COSQC in the design phase, all issues could finally be clarified to the full satisfaction of all stakeholders. Consequently the Minister for Planning signed the project document on 9th July 2012.

All findings and outcomes of the inception phase were discussed and presented for approval and endorsement at the first Steering Committee (SC) meeting. The meeting took place on 22nd November 2012 in Erbil, Iraq and was preceded by a Technical Review meeting on 21st November 2012. All key results, findings and recommendations of the inception phase are presented in the inception report which was submitted to all major

project stakeholders and endorsed by the steering committee in its first meeting. Subsequently, the inception report was annexed to the original project document. In general, the inception phase re-confirmed the importance and relevance of this project to the Iraqi Economy, and the high interest and commitment of the national stakeholders to cooperate in its implementation.

FOOD SAFETY EXTENSION

After the first year of full-fledged implementation substantial progress had been made in establishing IQAS as the national accreditation body of Iraq, in initiating the progress of developing a national regulatory and quality policy, and following the formation of a permanent core negotiating team first trainings were provided on WTO accession and other issues.

Following Sida's very positive overall assessment of the first year of implementation of the project, UNIDO and MoP/COSQC were entrusted to elaborate a proposal complementary to the ongoing intervention as to expand the overall scope of the aforementioned project. In line with the Swedish Development Strategy for Iraq, this additional component aimed at supporting the country in its endeavor to become a full member of the WTO in a complementary manner, and in particular focusing on enhancing the country's compliance with the SPS agreement.

The project extension proposal was discussed in depth with Sida in a meeting in Amman, Jordan on 22nd October 2013 and the structure follows the requirements of the new IT system of Sida. Subsequently, the proposal was reviewed by the project's steering committee and endorsed in its meeting in Amman on 2nd and 3rd December 2013. The development objective of the project remains unchanged and is to enhance the trade capacities and performance of the Republic of Iraq and fostering integration into the regional and multilateral trading system.

While the ongoing part of the project aims at achieving this goal by upgrading the national quality system as a whole and across various sectors, the proposed extension focuses on strengthening the national food safety control system following international best practices as to create an enabling environment for a better trade performance and consumer protection in this sector.

CONCLUSION OF SIDA'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR IRAQ

In view of the conclusion of Sweden's Development Strategy for Iraq in December 2014, and the closure of Sida's Iraq Unit in Stockholm in June 2016, a coordination meeting between UNIDO and Sida took place in November 2015 in order to discuss possible options for utilizing any remaining funds for Iraq also after the foreseen date of project closure.

In this regard Sida raised the need for an external assessment of the project which subsequently shall lead to a set of recommendations which shall provide the scope and framework for any possible re-allocation of funds. Following the discussions held in Stockholm, UNIDO recruited an international expert who then met in May 2016, in the presence of UNIDO staff, with counterparts from COSQC and subsequently also with Sida, in order to discuss the progress and achievements of the project, as well as the future needs and priorities in regard to the upgrading of Iraq's national quality and food control system. The assessment report was finalized in June 2016 and a set of recommendations,

focusing on strengthening the sustainability of the project's achievements, were proposed to COSQC and Sida.

NO-COST EXTENSION OF THE PROJECT

Based on the assessment report, representatives from COSQC, MoP, UNIDO, and Sida met in Stockholm on 1st September 2016 to discuss the achievements of the project to date, to review the expert's recommendations for interventions beyond 2016, as well as to agree on the way forward. In this regard Sida requested from UNIDO to prepare a 'bridging document' in order to provide at output level a detailed overview on the progress made to date, activities still remaining for implementation by end 2016, as well as the activities recommended for 2017.

Based on the submitted bridging document and considering the achievements made, Sida approved on 25th November 2016 on an exceptional basis a one year no-cost extension of the project, despite the closure of their development strategy for Iraq.

5. Budget information: Table 1. Financing plan summary - Outcome breakdown⁹

Project outcomes/components	Donor (\$)	Co-Financing (\$)	Total (\$)
Outcome 1	3,095,860	0	3,095,860
Outcome 2	3,764,592	0	3,764,592
Outcome 3	741,141	0	741,141
Outcome 4 - Project management	1,892,668		1,892,668
Outcome 5 – Monitoring, Evaluation, Governance and Security	391,872		391,872
Outcome 6	1,277,296	0	1,277,296
Inception phase	200,231	0	200,231
Total	11,363,660	0	11,363,660

Item	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total Expenditure (\$)
Contractual Services	640,155.36	538,623.00	1,570,694.18	1,322,903.44	849,511.28	416,476.64	5,338,363.9
Equipment	3,175.19	11,655.00	73,948.85	578,408.76	610,765.16	325,178.53	1,603,131.49
International Meetings	0	55,818.73	62,769.22	170,004.57	9,142.04	72,026.8	369,761.36
Local travel	20,154.3	79,785.68	70,658.8	115,002.61	101,574.55	77,152.45	464,328.39
Nat.Consult./Staff	39,409.48	150,466.61	163,742.51	146,805.71	151,314.19	136,823.46	788,561.96
Other Direct Costs	49,296.96	98,055.53	44,175.54	55,512.67	20,352.48	37,600.29	304,993.47

⁹ Source: Latest budget as approved by the donor and the counterpart before the 2017 extension.

Item	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total Expenditure (\$)
Staff & Intern Consultants	123,164.77	141,806.05	119,541.29	221,493.58	179,379.26	295,456.13	1,080,841.08
Staff Travel	18,637.89	9,671.2	7,796.21	14,091.14	9,419.94	16,650.17	76,266.55
Train/Fellowship/Study	12,842.07	95,733.17	244,243.79	183,103.14	114,826.53	20,908.84	671,657.54
Premises	0	210	9,538.86	26,005.65	17,245.76	4,338.46	57,338.73
Grand Total	906,836.02	1,181,824.97	2,367,109.25	2,833,331.27	2,063,531.19	1,402,611.77	10,755,244.47

Source: SAP, October, 2017 (as at 9 October 2017)

II. Evaluation purpose and scope

The purpose of the evaluation is to independently assess the project to help UNIDO improve performance and results of future programmes and projects.

The evaluation has two specific objectives:

- (i) Assess the project performance in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and progress to impact;
- (ii) Develop a series of findings, lessons and recommendations for enhancing the design of new and implementation of ongoing projects by UNIDO.

The independent terminal evaluation (TE) will cover the whole duration of the project from its starting date in 5/1/2017 to the estimated completion date in 12/31/2017, including the food safety extension which was approved at the end of 2013, as well as the no-cost extension for 2017.

III. Evaluation approach and methodology

The TE will be conducted in accordance with the UNIDO Evaluation Policy¹⁰ and the UNIDO Guidelines for the Technical Cooperation Project and Project Cycle¹¹.

The evaluation will be carried out as an independent in-depth evaluation using a participatory approach whereby all key parties associated with the project will be informed and consulted throughout the evaluation. The evaluation team leader will liaise with the UNIDO Independent Evaluation Division (ODG/EVQ/IEV) on the conduct of the evaluation and methodological issues.

The evaluation will use a theory of change approach and mixed methods to collect data and information from a range of sources and informants. It will pay attention to triangulating the data and information collected before forming its assessment. This is essential to ensure an evidence-based and credible evaluation, with robust analytical underpinning.

¹⁰ UNIDO. (2015). Director General's Bulletin: Evaluation Policy (UNIDO/DGB/(M).98/Rev.1)

¹¹ UNIDO. (2006). Director-General's Administrative Instruction No. 17/Rev.1: Guidelines for the Technical Cooperation Programme and Project Cycle (DGAI.17/Rev.1, 24 August 2006)

The theory of change will identify causal and transformational pathways from the project outputs to outcomes and longer-term impacts, and drivers as well as barriers to achieve them. The learning from this analysis will be useful to feed into the design of the future projects so that the management team can effectively manage them based on results.

1. Data collection methods

Following are the main instruments for data collection:

- (a) **Desk and literature review** of documents related to the project, including but not limited to:
 - The original project document, monitoring reports (such as progress and financial reports, mid-term review report, output reports, back-to-office mission report(s), end-of-contract report(s) and relevant correspondence.
 - Notes from the meetings of committees involved in the project.
- (b) **Stakeholder consultations** will be conducted through structured and semi-structured interviews and focus group discussion. Key stakeholders to be interviewed include:
 - UNIDO Management and staff involved in the project; and
 - Representatives of donors and counterparts.
- (c) **Field visit** to project sites in Baghdad in Iraq in order to meet with the project's main counterparts from the Central Organization for Standardization and Quality Control, and the Technical Support Unit (TSU) in Amman, Jordan.

2. Evaluation key questions and criteria

The key evaluation questions are the following:

- (a) What are the key drivers and barriers to achieve the long term objectives? To what extent has the project helped put in place the conditions likely to address the drivers, overcome barriers and contribute to the long term objectives?
- (b) How well has the project performed? Has the project done the right things? Has the project done things right, with good value for money?
- (c) What have been the project's key results (outputs, outcome and impact, if possible)? To what extent have the expected results been achieved or are likely to be achieved against the project design? To what extent the achieved results will sustain after the completion of the project?
- (d) What lessons can be drawn from the successful and unsuccessful practices in designing, implementing and managing the project?

The evaluation will assess the likelihood of sustainability of the project results after the project completion. The assessment will identify key risks (e.g. in terms of financial, socio-political, institutional and environmental risks) and explain how these risks may affect the continuation of results after the project ends. Table 1 below provides the key evaluation criteria to be assessed by the evaluation. The details questions to assess each evaluation criterion are in annex 2.

Table 1. Project evaluation criteria

#	Evaluation criteria	Mandatory rating
A	Impact (or progress toward impact)	Yes
B	Project design	Yes
1	• Overall design	Yes
2	• Logframe	Yes
C	Project performance	Yes
1	• Relevance	Yes
2	• Effectiveness	Yes
3	• Efficiency	Yes
4	• Sustainability of benefits	Yes
D	Cross-cutting performance criteria	
1	• Gender mainstreaming	Yes
2	• M&E:	Yes
	• M&E design	
	• M&E implementation	
3	• Results-based Management (RBM)	Yes
E	Performance of partners	
1	• UNIDO	Yes
2	• National counterparts	Yes
3	• Donor	Yes
F	Overall assessment	Yes

3. Rating system

In line with the practice adopted by many development agencies, the UNIDO Independent Evaluation Division uses a six-point rating system, where 6 is the highest score (highly satisfactory) and 1 is the lowest (highly unsatisfactory) as per Table 2

Table 2. Project rating criteria

Score	Definition	Category
6	Highly satisfactory Level of achievement clearly exceeds expectations and there is no shortcoming.	SATISFACTORY
5	Satisfactory Level of achievement meets expectations (indicatively, over 80-95 per cent) and there is no or minor shortcoming.	
4	Moderately satisfactory Level of achievement more or less meets expectations (indicatively, 60 to 80 per cent) and there are some shortcomings.	

Score	Definition	Category
3	Moderately unsatisfactory Level of achievement is somewhat lower than expected (indicatively, less than 60 per cent) and there are significant shortcomings.	UNSATISFACTORY
2	Unsatisfactory Level of achievement is substantially lower than expected and there are major shortcomings.	
1	Highly unsatisfactory Level of achievement is negligible and there are severe shortcomings.	

IV. Evaluation process

The evaluation will be implemented in five phases which are not strictly sequential, but in many cases iterative, conducted in parallel and partly overlapping:

- i. Inception phase: The evaluation team leader will prepare the inception report providing details on the methodology for the evaluation and include an evaluation matrix with specific issues for the evaluation; the specific site visits will be determined during the inception phase.
- ii. Desk review and data analysis;
- iii. Interviews, survey and literature review;
- iv. Field visits;
- v. Data analysis and report writing.

V. Time schedule and deliverables

The evaluation is scheduled to take place from 15 October to 30 Dec 2017. The evaluation field mission to Baghdad, Iraq and Amman, Jordan is tentatively planned for 20 November – 1 December 2017. At the end of the field mission, there will be a presentation of the preliminary findings for all stakeholders involved in this project.

After the evaluation field mission, the evaluation team leader will visit UNIDO HQ for debriefing and presentation of the preliminary findings of the terminal evaluation. The draft TE report will be submitted to UNIDO 3 weeks after the end of the mission. The draft TE report is to be shared with the UNIDO IEV, UNIDO Project Manager, Sida and other stakeholders for comments and verification of factual and interpretation errors. The TE leader is expected to revise the draft TE report based on the comments received, edit the language and form and submit the final version in accordance with UNIDO ODG/EVQ/IEV standards.

Table 3. Tentative schedule

Timelines	Tasks
15 Oct—30 October 2017	Desk review and preparation of inception report
Before 3 Nov 2017	Briefing with UNIDO Project Manager and experts based in Vienna – through Skype
20 Nov – 1 Dec 2017	Field visits
Week 11 December	Debriefing in Vienna

Timelines	Tasks
22 Dec 2017	Preparation of first draft evaluation report Preparation of first draft evaluation report Internal peer review of the report by the UNIDO ODG/EVQ/IEV and other stakeholders comments to draft evaluation report
30 Jan 2018	Final evaluation report

VI. Evaluation team composition

The evaluation team will be composed of one international evaluation consultant acting as the team leader and one international consultant with expertise on quality infrastructure and speak Arabic. The evaluation team will possess relevant strong experience and expertise on evaluation and on quality infrastructure. Both consultants will be contracted by UNIDO.

The tasks of each team member are specified in the job descriptions annexed to these terms of reference.

According to UNIDO Evaluation Policy, members of the evaluation team must not have been directly involved in the design and/or implementation of the project under evaluation.

An evaluation manager from UNIDO ODG/EVQ/IEV will provide technical backstopping to the evaluation team and ensure the quality of the evaluation. The UNIDO Project Manager and national project teams will act as resourced persons and provide support to the evaluation team and the evaluation manager. The UNIDO Project Manager and the project team in Amman will provide logistical and administrative support the evaluation team to prepare for the field visits. The project team will provide a proposed list of stakeholders (e.g. government officials, private sector representatives and other relevant individuals) to the evaluation team who will make the final decision on who to consult. The project team will arrange the meetings and prepare field visit schedule for the evaluation team, following their request, prior to the field visit.

The evaluation team will maintain close liaison with the representatives of UNIDO, other UN agencies as well as with the concerned national agencies, and with national and international project staff. The evaluation team is free to discuss with the authorities concerned anything relevant to its assignment. However, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government, the donor or UNIDO.

VII. Reporting

Inception report

This Terms of Reference (ToR) provides some information on the evaluation methodology, but this should not be regarded as exhaustive. After reviewing the project documentation and initial interviews with the project manager, the Team Leader will prepare, in collaboration with the team member, a short inception report that will operationalize the ToR relating to the evaluation questions and provide information on what type of and how the evidence will be collected (methodology). It will be discussed with and approved by the responsible UNIDO Evaluation Manager.

The Inception Report will focus on the following elements: preliminary project theory model(s); elaboration of evaluation methodology including quantitative and qualitative

approaches through an evaluation framework (“evaluation matrix”); division of work between the team leader and team members; mission plan, including places to be visited, people to be interviewed and possible surveys to be conducted and a debriefing and reporting timetable¹².

Evaluation report format and review procedures

The draft report will be delivered to ODG/EVQ/IEV (the suggested report outline is in Annex 4) and circulated to UNIDO staff and national stakeholders associated with the project for factual validation and comments. Any comments or responses, or feedback on any errors of fact to the draft report provided by the stakeholders will be sent to UNIDO ODG/EVA for collation and onward transmission to the project evaluation team who will be advised of any necessary revisions. On the basis of this feedback, and taking into consideration the comments received, the evaluation team will prepare the final version of the terminal evaluation report.

The evaluation team will present its preliminary findings to the local stakeholders at the end of the field visit and take into account their feed-back in preparing the evaluation report. A presentation of preliminary findings will take place at UNIDO HQ after the field mission.

The TE report should be brief, to the point and easy to understand. It must explain the purpose of the evaluation, exactly what was evaluated, and the methods used. The report must highlight any methodological limitations, identify key concerns and present evidence-based findings, consequent conclusions, recommendations and lessons. The report should provide information on when the evaluation took place, the places visited, who was involved and be presented in a way that makes the information accessible and comprehensible. The report should include an executive summary that encapsulates the essence of the information contained in the report to facilitate dissemination and distillation of lessons.

Findings, conclusions and recommendations should be presented in a complete, logical and balanced manner. The evaluation report shall be written in English, with an executive summary in English and Arabic, and follow the outline given in annex 1.

VIII. Quality assurance

All UNIDO evaluations are subject to quality assessments by UNIDO ODG/EVQ/IEV. Quality assurance and control is exercised in different ways throughout the evaluation process (briefing of consultants on methodology and process of UNIDO ODG/EVQ/IEV, providing inputs regarding findings, lessons learned and recommendations from other UNIDO evaluations, review of inception report and evaluation report by UNIDO ODG/EVQ/IEV).

The quality of the evaluation report will be assessed and rated against the criteria set forth in the Checklist on evaluation report quality, attached as Annex 4. The applied evaluation quality assessment criteria are used as a tool to provide structured feedback. UNIDO ODG/EVQ/IEV should ensure that the evaluation report is useful for UNIDO in terms of organizational learning (recommendations and lessons learned) and is compliant with UNIDO’s evaluation policy and these terms of reference. The draft and final

¹² The evaluator will be provided with a Guide on how to prepare an evaluation inception report prepared by the UNIDO ODG/EVQ/IEV.

evaluation report are reviewed by UNIDO ODG/EVQ/IEV, which will submit the report to the donor and circulate it within UNIDO together with a management response sheet.

Annex B. Review Framework

Evaluation Criteria	Lines of inquiries, verifiers, indicators	Means of verification (Method)	Data source and location of data collection	Who's responsibility (evaluation team member)
Progress to impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Information, lessons or specific project results are incorporated into broader stakeholder mandates and initiatives - The project's specific results are adopted, reproduced, and implemented at larger geographical scale - The project has contributed to the three UNIDO impact dimensions – visible 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussions with UNIDO project management and staff in HQ and TSU and Baghdad office - Discussions with key counterparts - Triangulation with findings from project documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project manager, Senior International Project Coordinator, other project staff as feasible, Counterparts - Skype and/or Mission to Amman and Baghdad - Debriefing in Vienna 	Evaluation team leader & quality infrastructure team member
Project design				
- overall design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The gap/need to be addressed by the project is clearly defined and the project is consistent with the priorities of Iraq - The linkage to the regional project has added value to the priorities of Iraq - Best practices/lessons learned from thematic SMTQ evaluation are integrated into project design - The project design (funding, institutional and implementation arrangements) remains valid in the Iraqi conflict context 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review and analysis of project documentation - Interviews with project staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project document, inception document, bridging document, independent assessment (2016) (home-based) - Project Manager, Senior International Project Coordinator, M&E officer, other project staff as feasible - Mission to Amman and Baghdad and/or Skype 	Evaluation team leader & quality infrastructure team member

- logframe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The expected results chain is clear and logical (impact, outcomes, outputs) - Impact describes a desired long-term change or benefit, outcome describes a change in behaviour/performance of target group or system/institutional performance, output describe deliverables that the project will produce to achieve outcomes - Indicators specify expected results (impact, outcome, output), are SMART and provide cross-checking (triangulation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review and analysis of project documentation - Interviews with project staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project document, inception document, bridging document, independent assessment (2016) (home-based) - Project Manager, Senior International Project Coordinator, M&E officer, other project staff as feasible - Mission to Amman and Baghdad and/or Skype 	Evaluation team leader & quality infrastructure team member
Project performance				
- Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project objectives (expected results) remain valid and aligned with Iraq's development priorities - The project reflects donor policies/priorities and corresponds to UNIDO's comparative advantage - The project is a technically adequate solution to the development problem 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review and analysis of project documentation - Interviews with project staff - Interviews with counterparts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project document, inception document, bridging document, independent assessment (2016) (home-based) - Project Manager, Senior International Project Coordinator, M&E officer, other project staff as feasible - Counterparts - Mission to Amman and Baghdad and/or Skype 	Evaluation team leader & quality infrastructure team member
- Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The project achieved its objectives (outputs and outcomes) against the revised targets in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review and analysis of project documentation - Interviews with project staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project document, inception document, bridging document, independent assessment (2016) 	Evaluation team leader & quality infrastructure team member

	<p>inception report</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The quality of results is adequate in the Iraqi context and the right target group was reached - Counterparts perceive the quality of results to be adequate - Identified progress results are attributable to the intervention rather than to external factors - Identified effectiveness gaps - Detailed questions per outcome/output to assess technical effectiveness are seen from Annex B.1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews with counterparts 	<p>(home-based)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project Manager, Senior International Project Coordinator, M&E officer, other project staff as feasible - Counterparts - Mission to Amman and Baghdad and/or Skype 	
- Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Results were achieved within the budget and time frame - Alternative approaches to partnership arrangements (UNCTAD and Swedac) would have accomplished the same results at less cost/or not - Inputs from donor/UNIDO/Government have been provided as planned, and were adequate to meet the requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review and analysis of project documentation - Interviews with project staff - Interviews with counterparts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project document, inception document, bridging document, independent assessment (2016) (home-based) - Project Manager, Senior International Project Coordinator, M&E officer, other project staff as feasible - Counterparts - Mission to Amman and Baghdad and/or Skype 	Evaluation team leader & quality infrastructure team member
- Sustainability of benefits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Outputs and results have been institutionalized - An exit strategy has been agreed with counterparts - The likelihood/risk that financial resources will not be available once 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review and analysis of project documentation - Interviews with project staff - Interviews with counterparts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project document, inception document, bridging document, independent assessment (2016) (home-based) - Project Manager, Senior International Project Coordinator, 	

	<p>the project ends</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The likelihood/risk that stakeholder ownership will be insufficient to allow for the project outcomes to be sustained - The likelihood/risk that legal framework or government structures and processes will jeopardize the sustainability of project benefits 		<p>M&E officer, other project staff as feasible</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Counterparts - Mission to Amman and Baghdad and/or Skype 	
Cross-cutting performance criteria				
Gender mainstreaming	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Gender Manual from the inception phase has been implemented. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews with key project staff and counterpart top management and staff - Triangulation with progress reporting ad SC meeting notes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project Manager, Senior International Project Coordinator, other project staff as feasible, Counterparts - Skype and/or Mission to Amman and Baghdad - Debriefing in Vienna 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evaluation team leader
Good governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Good Governance Manual from the inception phase has been implemented. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews with key project staff and counterpart top management and staff - Triangulation with progress reporting ad SC meeting notes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project Manager, Senior International Project Coordinator, other project staff as feasible, Counterparts - Skype and/or Mission to Amman and Baghdad - Debriefing in Vienna 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evaluation team leader
M&E design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The M&E plan in the Pro Doc was practical and sufficient, including baseline data, clear targets with appropriate indicators to track 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of M&E plan - Discussion with project staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Senior International Project Coordinator, M&E officer - Home-based, Skype and /or Mission to Amman and Baghdad 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation team leader & quality infrastructure team member

	<p>results</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The M&E plan specified a proper M&E methodological approach - The M&E plan is consistent with the logframe 			
M&E implementation and results-based management (RBM)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - M&E information was used in project implementation and to adapt to changing needs and improve performance - Causes of potential delays have been addressed - Risks have been outlined, monitored and managed - Results and lessons derived from the adaptive management process have been documented and shared with key partners and internalized by partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussion with TSU Amman - Discussion with project staff - Triangulation with findings from review of M&E documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project manager, Senior International Project Coordinator, M&E officer, other project staff as feasible - Mission to Amman and Baghdad, home-based and Skype 	Evaluation team leader & quality infrastructure team member
Performance of partners				
UNIDO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Clear division of responsibilities and reporting lines between HQ / TSU Amman / Baghdad office - Project SC with clearly defined roles and responsibilities - Fulfilment of responsibilities of each project partner (including UNCTAD and Swedac working in partnerships with UNDO) - Transparent decision-making - Adequate technical expertise timely mobilized 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussion with project manager in Vienna - Discussion with senior international project coordinator in TSU/ Amman - Discussion with project staff in Baghdad office - Triangulation with findings from review of project documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Skype discussion - Mission to Amman and Baghdad 	Evaluation team leader & quality infrastructure team member

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Timely recruitment of project staff and in cases of staff turnover - Implementation bottlenecks addressed 			
National counterparts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National counterparts were actively engaged in project design - Support has been provided to the project as per agreed actions and policies in jointly approved documents - National counterpart funding has been available as agreed - Cross-governmental coordination has been efficient and effective - Facilitation of private sector involvement has been appropriate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussions with national partners - Triangulation with findings from review of project documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mission to Iraq - Debriefing with SC in Vienna 	Evaluation team leader & quality infrastructure team member
Donor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Timely disbursement of funds? - Feedback to progress reports? - Support by Sida's country presence or otherwise? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussion with project staff - Debriefing with Swedish Embassy in Baghdad 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project manager and Senior International Project Coordinator - Skype and/or Mission to Amman and Baghdad 	- Evaluation team leader
Overall assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Findings and analysis from Project Performance and Progress to Impact in order to assess four key questions from ToR (see section 5 above) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Consolidation of findings and analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Home-based - Debriefing with UNIDO Vienna - Debriefing with SC members 	- Evaluation team leader & quality infrastructure team member

Annex C. List of documents reviewed

Project Documents:

UNIDO (2012): Project Document: *Strengthening the national quality infrastructure to facilitate trade and enhance consumer protection*, (UNIDO SAP ID: 100209), Vienna.

UNIDO and COSQC (November 2012): Inception Report: *Strengthening the national quality infrastructure to facilitate trade and enhance consumer protection*, (Iraq – TFIRQ11004), (Adopted by the PSC 22nd November 2012).

UNIDO (2014): Project Extension Proposal: *Strengthening the national quality infrastructure to facilitate trade and enhance consumer protection – food safety extension*, (TFIQ11004/100209), Vienna.

UNIDO and COSQC (November 2016): Bridging Document: *Strengthening the national quality infrastructure to facilitate trade and enhance consumer protection*, Iraq – TFIRQ11004. Vienna and Baghdad.

El-Tawil, Anwar (June 2016): *Progress Evaluation Report of 'Strengthening the Quality Infrastructure in Iraq'*, UNIDO Project TFIRQ 110004, (Attached to Bridging Document)

UNIDO - SAP KPIs on Output and Outcome levels

UNIDO (15 February 2018): *Overall Project Achievements*, Power Point Presentation (in Amman during Field Mission).

UNIDO (February 2018): *Overview of status of supported conformity assessment bodies*.

Republic of Iraq (2017): *Iraq's National Quality system is Regaining Regional and International Recognition*, Brochure (published by UNIDO).

Minutes of Meeting (MoM):

November 21-22, 2012: *Minutes of the first Project Steering Committee Meeting. Strengthening the National Quality Infrastructure to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Consumer Protection Project*, (Annex 9), Erbil, Iraq.

December 3-4, 2013: *Minutes of Second Steering Committee Meeting for Strengthening the National Quality Infrastructure to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Consumer Protection Project*, Amman.

January 8-9, 2015: *3rd Steering Committee - Strengthening the national quality infrastructure to facilitate trade and enhance consumer protection*, Ankara.

April 14, 2015: *Mid-Term budget revision meeting of "Strengthening the Quality Infrastructure to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Consumer Protection" project*, Amman.

December 8-9, 2015: *Minutes of the Forth Steering Committee Meeting for Strengthening the National Quality Infrastructure to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Consumer Protection Project*, Amman, Jordan.

January 26, 2017: *Minutes of the Fifth Steering Committee Meeting for Strengthening the National Quality Infrastructure to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Consumer Protection Project*, Dead Sea, Jordan.

Progress Reporting:

COSQC (January – December 2013): Annual Report #1, Strengthening the National Quality Infrastructure to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Consumer Protection, (Iraq-TFIRQ 11004), Baghdad.

COSQC (January – December 2014): Annual Report #2, Strengthening the National Quality Infrastructure to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Consumer Protection, (Iraq-TFIRQ 11004), Baghdad.

COSQC (January – December 2015): Annual Progress Report #3, Strengthening the National Quality Infrastructure to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Consumer Protection Project, (Draft), (Iraq-TFIRQ 11004), Baghdad.

UNIDO (October 2015): Strengthening the National Quality Infrastructure to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Consumer Protection in Iraq. Summary Report Progress with Food Safety Component.

COSQC (January – December 2016): Draft Annual Report #4, Strengthening the National Quality Infrastructure to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Consumer Protection Project, (Iraq-TFIRQ 11004), Baghdad.

Annual Work plan 2017 (with financial report as per 19 October 2017, and per 14 February 2018).

Beitouni, Issa (February 2018): Upgrading of Selected Food Processing Enterprises. Summary Project Progress Report, submitted to UNIDO by Senior Food Safety & Food Quality System consultant.

Monitoring:

Monitoring

Plan_V6

Annex D. List of stakeholders consulted

Project staff UNIDO HQ:

Mr. Ali Badarneh – Project Manager
Ms. Christina Hefel – Associate Industrial Development Expert
Ms. Heba Hamed – Project Assistant

Project staff TSU Amman:

Mr. Hasan Abdel Jabar – Senior International Project Coordinator
Ms. Hala Khawaldeh - M&E Officer
Ms. Hala Mango – Administrative and Finance Assistant

COSQC Top Management:

Ms. Nisreen Swadi – Director General of Quality Control Department, Coordinator of Project Steering Committee
Mr. Qussai Ibraheem – Director General of Standardization Department

Standards Department of COSQC:

Mr. Isam Saeed - Head of Engineering- Standardization Department, Coordinator of standardization component

QC Department of COSQC (including Food Safety):

Mr. Nabeel Mohammad - Head of Food Safety Section, Coordinator of food safety component
Mr. Mohammad Yousef - Chemist- trainee in Amman training program for borders' inspectors

Metrology Department of COSQC:

Ms. Hanan Jalil - Head of Metrology Department
Ms. Khulood Khalid - Head of mass and pressure section
Ms. Khalid Naser -
Ms. Hana Al Saeed - Head of Dimensional Section
Ms. Wedad Hadi - Electrical instruments calibration
Ms. Farah Amir - Head of force and hardness section

IQAS:

Ms: Ilham Husain - IQAS General manager
Ms. Nadia Mohammad- Chief of senior chemist
Ms. Ban Ibrahim - Vice general manager of IQAS
Mr. Ahmad Qusay - Quality Manager of IQAS- Senior Engineer
Mr. Abdul Wahid Mohammad - Chief Engineer

Ministry of Health: Central Public Health Lab (CPHL):

Ms. Bayan Hasan – Head of Food Micro Lab
Ms. Sanaa Alizi – Quality Assurance Manager
Ministry of Industry:
Mr. Ala'a Shubber – Director General of Strategic Management
Ms. Thanaa M (ohan -Legal Advisor

Ministry of Industry:

Mr. Ala'a Shubber – Director General of Strategic Management
Ms. Thanaa M (ohan -Legal Advisor

Ministry of Trade (Skype):

Mr. Tharwat Akram Salman – Director WTO Department, Foreign Relations Department (former)

University of Technology and COSQC:

Mr. Sinan Abdul Ghatat - University of Technology, Teacher

Mr. Wael Shawky -University of Technology, Teacher

Mr. Laith Jaafer - University of Technology, Teacher

Mr. Munther Daway – COSQC, Coordinator for QI practitioner

Mr. Muthana Saady – COSQC

Federation of Iraqi Chambers of Commerce:

Mr. Abdul Hussein Mubaraka - Secretary General

Al-Malwiah Spices and Powder Company:

Mr. Naser Oraibi - General Manager

Mr. Ghaith Naser - Employee

Mr. Abdalkhalek Abbas – Employee (Interpreter)

Mr. Zaid Akram - Food Safety Expert (hired by UNIDO)

Selected COSQC Trainees and respective training topics :

Mr. Mohaimen Al Asad, HACCP, ISO/ IEC 17025

Mr. Reem Abdualla, ISO/ IEC 17025

Mr. Shams Mutasm Zeki, ISO/ IEC 17025

Ms. Lamea Hussam, ISO 22000

Mr. Shaker Mahmoud, Inspectors Training AMMAN

Mr. Nada Hashim Mohamed, Uncertainty

Ms. Azhar Bahjat

Ms. Nadia Aboudi

Ms. Rasha Othman

Swedish Embassy:

Ms. Josefine Hellgren – First Secretary, Political Affairs

UNCTAD:

Mr. Khairedine RAMOUL - Economic Affairs Officer - Trade Negotiations and Commercial Diplomacy Branch - Division on International Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities (DITC)

Swedac:

Ms. Mehri Malmqvist Nilsson – Acting Director General

Mr. Per Lundmark – International Secretariat – Project Leader

Sida HQ Stockholm:

Ms. Margareta Davidsson-Abdelli – Regional Development Cooperation - Economic Development

Other (during Field Mission):

Tour through supported COSQC Labs

UN Security Briefing

Annex E. Project logframe

Outcomes 1-5: From original project's inception report

Outcome 6: from food extension project document

CAUSAL CHAIN OF RESULTS	
Development Objective	
To enhance trade capacities and performance of the Republic of Iraq and fostering integration into the regional and multilateral trading system.	
OUTCOME 1	
OUTCOME 1	<i>Adapted to the new principles of the international trade regime, the Iraqi quality system (i.e. legal framework and infrastructure) is effective in promoting trade and in improving consumer protection, and national institutions are competent in advocating and managing the national quality system.</i>
	Output 1.1
	<i>A national quality system framework (i.e. policy and a strategic action plan) is developed and promoted among all stakeholders and submitted for GoI endorsement.</i>
	Activity 1.1.1 Establish a High Level multi-stakeholder Committee, under the Ministry of Planning, with the responsibility of managing the process of reforming the national quality system.
	Activity 1.1.2 Conduct an in-depth and intensive mapping and assessment of the existing National Quality System, and report and validate results at national level through a national consultation process with the aim of defining the national strategic directions.
	Activity 1.1.3 Draft the National Quality System Framework (i.e. policy, strategy and strategic action plan) in compliance with international best practices and submit for endorsement by the Government of Iraq.
	Activity 1.1.4 Implement a national awareness campaign to promote the National Quality System targeting parliament officials, professionals, SMEs and consumer groups.
	Output 1.2
	<i>The national metrology system is strengthened in line with the national quality system framework, and COSQC's implementation capacities upgraded, meeting the needs of an operational accreditation body.</i>
	Activity 1.2.1 Revise the legal and policy framework for the national metrology system based on international best practices and within the framework of the National Quality System, and define the role and responsibility of the COSQC in this regard.
Activity 1.2.2 Conduct an in-depth assessment on the country's laboratories and their parameters and traceability needs with the aim of identifying the priority fields of traceability. Asses the capacities and capabilities of the COSQC Metrology Department for meeting these needs.	
Activity 1.2.3 Support and strengthen the Laboratories of the Metrology Department of COSQC to meet the demand of the country's traceability priorities needed to support the National Accreditation Body.	

	Activity 1.2.4 Strengthen the human resource capacity of the COSQC Metrology Department with focus on calibration and traceability. Provide training to the laboratories staff, with technical and practical training in specialized laboratories, to support the identified priority fields.
	Activity 1.2.5 Implement a national awareness campaign on the role and benefits of Metrology implemented at national level.
	Activity 1.2.6 Revise and structure the Hall Mark Department of COSQC to carry out its mission as the National Legal Metrology Department NLMD. Build up cooperation with the international organization of legal metrology, OIML.
	Output 1.3
	<i>In line with the TBT and SPS agreement COSQC's capacities as the national standardization organization are strengthened for the implementation of the national quality system.</i>
	Activity 1.3.1 Revise COSQC system and procedures for developing/adopting national/international standards following international best practices.
	Activity 1.3.2 Establish the legal and policy framework for the national technical regulations system NTRS and re-engineer its activities based on international best practices.
	Activity 1.3.3 Establish the National Technical Regulations system NTRS (procedures and committees), train national teams and assure adequate qualification.
	Activity 1.3.4 Strengthen and support COSQC participation in the international standardization organizations.
	Activity 1.3.5 Revise and optimize policies and procedures for a national market surveillance system NMSS within the Quality Control Directorate at the COSQC. Provide training to the staff on the effective implementation of at least one comprehensive market surveillance programme.
	Activity 1.3.6 Implement the national awareness campaign within the different governmental organizations and the private sectors to promote the technical regulation, standardization, and market surveillance systems.
OUTCOME 2	
	<i>Conformity assessment services (i.e. testing, certification, inspection) accredited by a regionally and internationally recognized independent Iraqi Accreditation Body are offered on the market.</i>
	Output 2.1
	<i>Following international best practice an independent national accreditation body is established and internationally/regionally recognized.</i>
	Activity 2.1.1: Establish the legal and policy framework for the national accreditation body (NAB) following international best practices.
	Activity 2.1.2 Establish and implement the institutional governance and quality management system, including a sustainability / business plan for its operations.
	Activity 2.1.3 Following internationally recognized training curriculum, strengthen needed human resources (i.e. staff, auditors, assessors, trainers and experts) in the implementation of the accreditation system.
	Activity 2.1.4 Establish the capacity of the National Accreditation Body as a national training provider with an ongoing training program running on yearly basis.
	Activity 2.1.5 Promote the National Accreditation Body at national, regional and international level and facilitate membership with ARAC, ILAC, and IAF, and implement a national awareness campaign on the role and benefits of accreditation (conformity assessment providers, consumers, beneficiaries, SMEs).
OUTCOME 2	

	Output 2.2
	<i>Up to 5 testing / calibration laboratories, one certification body and one inspection body (from COSQC where possible) accredited as a pilot project for the National Accreditation Body.</i>
	Activity 2.2.1 Mapping of existing conformity assessment bodies and selection of bodies for the accreditation pilot programme.
	Activity 2.2.2 Conduct gap analysis of selected conformity assessment bodies.
	Activity 2.2.3 Training of staff and development of business plan.
	Activity 2.2.4 Implement quality management system and support towards accreditation to ISO 17025/17011.
	Output 2.3
	<i>A national proficiency testing scheme developed at COSQC and implemented in partnership with regional / international partners.</i>
	Activity 2.3.1 Develop national proficiency testing scheme.
	Activity 2.3.2 Provide trainings and implement national awareness campaign.
OUTCOME 3	
OUTCOME 3	<i>Enhanced national trade policy framework fostering progress in the WTO accession process.</i>
	Output 3.1 <i>Capacity of senior officials in trade policymaking built, capabilities and competencies of the national WTO negotiating team strengthened, and involvement of the private sector in policymaking and in the WTO accession process increased.</i>
OUTCOME 4	
OUTCOME 4	<i>Effective coordination and management of the project</i>
	Output 4.1 <i>Technical Support Unit in Amman operational</i>
	Output 4.2 <i>National Coordination support in Baghdad</i>
	Output 4.3 <i>UNIDO HQ support</i>
OUTCOME 5	

OUTCOME 5	<i>Effective monitoring, evaluation and governance of the project, including security support</i>
	Output 5.1
	<i>Monitoring, Mid-term Review/Evaluation, Steering Committee Meetings, and security support</i>
	Output 5.2
	<i>Independent final evaluation</i>
INCEPTION	<i>Inception Phase</i>
	<i>Inception Report (i.e. development of project guidance documents/manuals, technical mappings/gap analysis, etc.)</i>
	<i>Technical Review and Steering Committee/Validation meetings</i>
Outcome 6	
	<i>Adapted to international best practices, the Iraqi food control system is effective</i>
	<i>Inception Phase</i>
	Output 6.1
	<i>The existing national multi-stakeholder Committee for Food Safety is fully operational and well integrated in international and regional networks/platforms.</i>
	Activity 6.1.1 Assess current set-up of the national food safety management, and facilitate the work of the national committee.
	Activity 6.1.2 Provide training/capacity-building to members of the national food safety committee.
	Activity 6.1.3 Provide CODEX training for staff from all relevant Ministries.
	Activity 6.1.4 Facilitate participation of the national committee in international and regional initiatives.
	Activity 6.1.5 Implement a national awareness campaign on food safety, including the conduct of campaigns and education of consumers on the risks of unsafe food on health.

	Output 6.2
	<i>Food testing laboratories are rehabilitated.</i>
	Activity 6.2.1 Selection of most relevant laboratories along Basra borders (50% of all food items imported to Iraq enter the country through Southern borders).
	Activity 6.2.2 Assessment of selected laboratories and establishment of detailed roadmaps, including technical revamping, equipment and consumables, training, etc., aiming at accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025.
	Activity 6.2.3 Provision of equipment and training as required.
	Activity 6.2.4 Accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025.
	Output 6.3
	<i>Border Food control system enhanced.</i>
	Activity 6.3.1 Assessment and review of current border control system against international best practice.
	Activity 6.3.2 Assessment and review of the national risk management strategy.
	Activity 6.3.3 Training/capacity-building of staff engaged in border controls, in particular inspection and testing.
	Activity 6.3.4 Provide technical and logistics means needed for food inspection and food control at entry points.
	Output 6.4
	<i>Enhanced food safety compliance of national food-processing enterprises.</i>
	Activity 6.4.1 FS interventions at SME level by supporting a number of food processing facilities to achieve HACCP certification by both technical support and physical investment.
	Activity 6.4.2. Qualifying local consultants as HACCP practitioners.
	Activity 6.4.3. Identifying the relationship and possible impact of trade capacity building to peace and security

Annex F. Semi-structured Questionnaire (technical effectiveness)

Overall goal:

is strengthening the national quality infrastructure to facilitate trade and enhance consumer protection through various technical support programs.

Project objective:

Is to enhance trade capacities and performance of the Republic of Iraq and fostering integration into the regional and multilateral trading system.

Specifically, is to upgrade the national quality infrastructure (Standards, Testing, Metrology and conformity assessment) following international best practices, for creating the enabling environment needed for better trade performance and consumer protection.

- *How do you evaluate the logical framework? Has it been a helpful tool for managing the project?*
- *How do you measure results at outcome level?*
- *Where/in which areas has the project succeeded? And where can the project do better?*

Outcome 1: Adapted to the new principles of the international trade regime, the Iraqi quality system (i.e. legal framework and infrastructure) is effective in promoting trade and in improving consumer protection, and national institutions competent in advocating and managing the national quality system.

Output 1.1: A national quality system framework (i.e. policy and a strategic action plan) is developed and promoted among all stakeholders and submitted for Gov. endorsement.

- *How do you evaluate the logical framework and its indicators?*
- *What was the expected no. of intended policies any regulations?*
- *How many policies were developed, adopted, or still under development?*
- *What are the justifications of having multi-policies instead of one comprehensive policy?*
- *One of the indicators used is the no. of trainees, how do you evaluate the indicator? Do you think that the indicator measures the progress and how well the project performs?*
- *How were the trainees selected?*
- *What are the results of their participation in developing and adopting policies?*

Output 1.2: The national metrology system is strengthened in line with the national quality system framework, and COSQC's implementation capacities upgraded, meeting the needs of an operational accreditation body.

- *How many labs were assessed? What is the type of assessment?*
- *Do you think that the indicators are related, efficient and measuring results?*
- *Were the 7 mentioned labs in the last annual report accredited?*
- *How far from accreditation are they?*

Output 1.3

In line with the TBT and SPS agreement COSQC's capacities as the national standardization organization are strengthened for the implementation of the national quality system.

- *How do you evaluate the logical framework? Do you think that the indicator measures the progress and how well the project performs?*
- *Where are the results in terms of stronger capacity in practice seen?*

Outcome 2: Conformity assessment services (i.e. testing, certification, inspection) accredited by a regionally and internationally recognized independent Iraqi Accreditation Body are offered on the market.

Output 2.1: *Following international best practice an independent national accreditation body is established and internationally/regionally recognized.*

- *How do you evaluate the logical framework and its indicators?*
- *One of the indicators is No. of laws developed/ adopted? Is this relevant? How many laws are expected?*
- *How do you measure international/regional recognition?*

Output 2.2: *Up to 5 testing / calibration laboratories, one certification body and one inspection body (from COSQC where possible) accredited as a pilot project for the National Accreditation Body.*

- *How many accredited bodies do you have?*

Output 2.3: *A national proficiency testing scheme developed at COSQC and implemented in partnership with regional / international partners.*

- *How do you evaluate the logical framework and its indicators?*
- *How many runs did you implement?*
- *In which fields the runs were?*
- *Do you have the capabilities to cover all the accredited testing fields? What is your plan for the missing fields?*

Outcome 3: Enhanced national trade policy framework fostering progress in the WTO accession process.

Output 3.1: *Capacity of senior officials in trade policy making built, capabilities and competencies of the national WTO negotiating team strengthened, and involvement of the private sector in policy making and in the WTO accession process increased.*

Outcome 4: Effective coordination and management of the project.

Outcome 5: Effective Monitoring, Evaluation and Governance of the project, including Security Support.

Outcome 6: Adapted to international best practices, the Iraqi food control system is effective.

Output 6.2: *Food testing laboratories are rehabilitated*

- *One of the indicators used is the no. of trainees, how do you evaluate this indicator? Do you think that the indicator measures the results?*
- *How were the trainees selected?*
- *What are the results of their participation in developing and adopting policies?*
- *Are the labs implementing ISO/ IEC 17025? Are they accredited? Are they participating in proficiency testing schemes?*

Output 6.3: *Border control system enhanced*

- *How do you think that the training programs have added a value to the control system? What are these values?*

Output 6.4: *Enhanced food safety compliance of national food-processing enterprises.*

- *Is there any certified company against HACCP?*